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Performance Risk, Form Contracts and UCITA
INTRODUCTION
A. The Economics of Form Contracts and the Uncertainty
of Performance Risk
Problems in the performance of bargains have always plagued
commerce. Whether it was the miller who did not receive the shaft, the
building owner with the wrong pipes, or the bank with "millennial bug"-
infested software, the failure of a product to meet a purchaser's expec-
tations has always presented vexing commercial problems. Even when
both parties to the transaction intend to honor their undertakings and act
in a commercially honorable fashion, disagreements still arise over just
what performance was due and how the problem should be solved.
It is not surprising that our legal institutions also have struggled to
allocate these economic risks. For generations, performance problems in
commercial transactions have been treated primarily as matters of con-
tract law, and courts have looked to the intentions of the parties to
allocate risks of performance failure. The contractual approach has par-
ticularly failed to provide neat answers when the transactors neither
ignored those risks nor allocated them through negotiation, but instead
used a standardized document that purported to assign all performance
risks to the buyer through warranty disclaimers and limitations on
remedies.
In these "form contract" cases, courts cannot confidently point to
parties' actual, manifest, or mutual intentions, or blithely fill in the gaps
with default rules on the presumption that the parties would have ar-
rived at the same result if they had not ignored the issues. Nevertheless,
for the most part, the black letter doctrine has enforced the form-giver's
whim on the basis that the form-taker should have read the contract and
demanded a change or refused to deal if she did not like the terms.'
The problem with this approach, at least with respect to complex
transactions, is that courts of justice must turn a blind eye to a three-fold
truth:
1. The form-giver uses the form to avoid the transaction costs
of separate negotiation;
2. No rational form-taker would incur the costs necessary to
price and negotiate the form performance terms; and
1. The terms "form-giver" and "form-taker" have been borrowed from Melvin A. Eis-
enberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 241
(1995) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Cognition].
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3. No rational form-giver would expect a rational customer to
do so.
In other words, there is no tangible mutual assent and no factual ba-
sis, such as the form-giver's reasonable reliance, from which to imply
assent worthy of public enforcement. When it comes to allocating per-
formance risk, form contracts should not be worth the paper on which
they are printed.
Scholars as far back as Kessler and Llewellyn have recognized the
doctrinal and policy problems with the assent fiction.2 Llewellyn also
recognized the tendency of courts to use covert reasoning to avoid en-
forcing form contracts in particularly troublesome cases. No scholarly
commentator has suggested that the form contract rules provide a satis-
factory answer to the commercial problem of performance risk. So, one
might think that the dawn of the "information economy" would be a
propitious time to implement a new doctrinal approach. Apparently not:
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the
"Conference") has promulgated a comprehensive commercial statute
that fails to remedy or even modify the law of form contracts in purely
commercial transactions.
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA")-
drafted to provide the background law for many of the most significant
transactions in the information age3-simply accepts as holy writ "the
duty to read" tradition that has been handed down by our forefathers.
Specifically, § 113 of UCITA provides that the Act's default rules can
be varied by agreement and §§ 112 and 208 provide that manifested as-
sent to a standard form (by, for example, use of the product) constitutes
assent to each term of that form.4
The Conference proclaims that the Act is "a statute for our time;"
setting "forth uniform legal principles applicable to computer informa-
tion transactions. 5 This article considers whether the several States
should adopt the Act as drafted, when it continues a fiction that con-
2. Friedrich Kessler, Contacts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943). For a review of Llewellyn's views on the issue, see
Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv.
1173, 1197 ff. (1983).
3. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT, Prefatory Note (2000), The National
Conf. Of Commissioners on Unif. State Laws, available at http://wvw.law.upenn.edu/bll/
ulc/ulc_frame.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Prefatory Note].
4. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT, §§ 112, 113, 208 (2000), The National
Conf. of Commissioners on Unif. State Laws, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/
bll/ulc/ulc_frame.htm [hereinafter UCITA]. It has been adopted in Virginia and Maryland
and introduced in six others and the District of Columbia. See UCITAnews.com, available at
http://ucitanews.com/welcome.htm (last modified Jan. 19, 2001).
5. Prefatory Note, supra note 3.
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dones economic inefficiency and unfair resolution of disputes.6 Con-
eluding that UCITA cannot profess to be "a coherent contract law
framework for analyzing a license ... the dominant contractual frame-
work for commerce in computer information"7 without a more uniform
treatment of performance problems in form transactions, I propose an
alternative treatment based on efficient risk management principles.
B. The UCITA Approach (or Lack Thereof)
The Conference has promulgated UCITA to cover "a variety of
transactions" such as "access by Fortune 500 businesses to sophisticated
databases as well as distribution of software to the general public; it also
covers custom software development and the acquisition of various
rights in multimedia projects."' Indeed, UCITA is a marvel of legal en-
gineering, the result of a four-year drafting (and lobbying) process that
addresses a myriad of enigmatic issues created by the collision of con-
tract law, commercial law, intellectual property law and the ever-
accelerating development of the Internet and other electronic computer,
telecommunications and multi-media technologies. 9
Nevertheless, for all its achievements, UCITA is fatally flawed
when it comes to the enforcement of standardized performance terms in
commercial licensing transactions.0 It is the premise of this Article that
6. The focus of this article is whether and how a legislature can and should allocate
product performance risks. Therefore, I will cite few court cases. How a court should decide
these cases and allocate product performance risk when no statute exists and the parties have
not expressly allocated that risk by bargaining is not the subject of this article. For an exten-
sive discussion of court cases on warranty issues, see, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer, Images
and Contract Law-What Law Applies to TransactionS in Information, 36 Hous. L REv. 1
(1999); Peter A. Alces, W(h)ither Warranty: The B(l)oom of Products Liability Theory in
Cases of Deficient Software Design, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 269 (1999); and Joel Wolfson, Ex-
press Warranties and Published Information Content Under Article 2B: Does the Shoe Fit?,
16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 337 (1997).
7. Prefatory Note, supra note 3.
5. Id.
9. UCITA was not written by the Conference but by a Drafting Committee consisting
of eleven attorneys, plus two ex officio members, advised by five members of the American
Bar Association. This Committee also received substantial input from a large number of
trade groups, corporations, public interest groups and individuals. See Pratik A. Shah, The
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 85, 86 (2000).
The provisions of the Act were also heavily influenced, to put it mildly, by members of the
American Law Institute, during its previous life as proposed Article 2B of the Uniform
Commercial Code. See Jean Braucher, Why UCITA, Like UCC Article 2B, Is Premature and
Unsound, The 2B Guide, available at http:/www.2bguide.com/docs/0499jb.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 4, 2001). However, it is the Conference that ultimately approved the Act and
submitted it to consideration to the States.
10. I will use "performance terms" to refer to any contractual provision that (1) sets or
avoids a standard for how a product is to perform, the most common being a warranty dis-
claimer; or (2) provides or avoids a remedy for a failure to comply with a clause described in
2000-20011
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the Conference has tripped over its own bandwidth in promulgating
UCITA and thereby missed a golden opportunity to bring the legal
framework into alignment with the realities of those transactions.
It is ironic that the Conference, in purporting to follow the lead of
U.C.C. progenitor Karl Llewellyn," missed his real message. Llewellyn,
a father of "legal realism," believed that the law must reflect, not dic-
tate, the substance of commerce.' Llewellyn's "reflection" was not an
end in itself, but a means of achieving an efficient and dynamic econ-
omy. Enforcement of standardized performance terms will not achieve
that lofty goal: the transactional costs of investigating, evaluating, and
negotiating performance risk allocations simply preclude the bargaining
necessary for presumed efficiency. 3
UCITA's archaic notions of "freedom of contract" and presumed
assent,4 flowing from a 19th Century "duty to read,"' 5 ignore decades of
prominent scholarship that demonstrated the failure of contract doctrine
(1). Performance terms, because they deal with contingencies, are generally not included in
"dickered terms" and are among those provisions referred to by other commentators as
"contingent" or "invisible" terms. See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1250-55. By
"commercial transactions," I mean any transaction that is not a consumer or mass-market
transaction as defined in UCITA. In other words, this article addresses transactions where the
licensee is either a business entity or an individual who is entering into the transaction for a
business purpose.
11. Prefatory Note, supra note 3.
12. Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1198-1206; see also Alces, supra note 6, at 296-97.
13. The notion that bargaining will always produce economically efficient results as
long as there are no transaction costs and the other assumptions of modem economics are
satisfied is postulated by the Coase Theorem, which is perhaps the scholarly work most often
cited in law review articles. See Daniel A. Farber, Parody Lost/Pragmatism Regained: The
Ironic History of the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REv. 397, 399 (1997); see also Stewart
Schwab, Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen and Economists Do Not, 87 MICH .L.
Rev. 1171, 1189 (1989). For an excellent explanation of efficiency concepts, see Michael I.
Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real
World, 24 GA. L. REv. 583, 624 et seq. (1990). For the non-economist, for purposes of this
article, it is sufficient to understand that a transaction or other situation is efficient if it
maximizes aggregate benefits less aggregate costs. The essential inefficiency of form con-
tracts in the context of performance terms is that, because form-takers do not have and
cannot process accurate and complete information, we can have no assurance that they will
purchase the same amount of UCITA "computer information" in form transactions that they
would in fully-negotiated, true assent transactions. Whenever there is over or under pur-
chasing, we will not have an efficient situation because the parties' whose decisions have
been affected by the information disparities and potential transaction costs would alter their
purchasing decisions, and thus be better off, if those distortions were not present. As a result,
under the simple economic model, the aggregate allocation of resources in the UCITA econ-
omy will not be optimal. Economists may rightfully suggest that whether the allocation
would be optimal even without those distortions is questionable under the "Theory of the
Second Best." See Richard S. Markovits, Symposium on Second-Best Theory and Law and
Economics: An Introduction, 73 CH.-KENT L. REv. 3 (1998).
14. UCITA § 112.
15. Rakoff, supra note 2, 1184-85.
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to address adequately the phenomenon of standardized contracts." As a
result, the Act fails to provide a commercially or legally realistic allo-
cation of risk when products fail to perform in transactions documented
by boilerplate terms.
The failure of UCITA is particularly surprising because the Confer-
ence is so acutely aware of the significance of the information economy,
the benefits of information technology, and the need to reflect the reali-
ties of commercial practice. 7 In light of that awareness, however, the
Conference apparently has approached the problem using an obsolete
"image."' 8 UCITA's image is that commerce will depend on efficient
"default rules" and the freedom of parties to negotiate out of those de-
fault rules. In fact, the reality of the new economy, as it was in the last
stages of the old, is that the low per transaction costs of drafting and
imposing standardized contract terms make default rules largely irrele-
vant except perhaps as backdrops for a status quo bias when parties do
negotiate terms. 9
The new image that UCITA should have addressed is a transaction
where the licensee "accepts" boilerplate terms because she is both
trusting and sophisticated enough to know that (1) she does not have,
and cannot economically attain, sufficient information about a proprie-
tary producte0 to evaluate accurately the performance risk presented by
the terms, (2) the licensor neither expects nor desires negotiation of
those terms and (3) the term will be employed only as a last resort
measure in the unlikely event that business considerations fail to resolve
an unanticipated performance breakdown. Insofar as UCITA nowhere
deals with this image, it is destined to fail in its quest to make commer-
cial licensing transactions more certain and efficient.
16. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability
and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1993); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain
Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARv. L. REv. 741 (1982) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Bargain];
Eisenberg, Cognition, supra note 1; Arthur Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AMi. U. L. REv. 131
(1970); Meyerson, supra note 13; Rakoff, supra note 2; W. David Slawson, Standard Form
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HAxv. L. Rv. 529, 532 (1971);
Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97
COLUM. L. Rv. 1710 (1997) (Each article cited here is a fertile source of citations for addi-
tional literature on the interpretation and enforcement of form contracts).
17. Prefatory Note, supra note 3.
18. See Nimmer, supra note 6, at 3 (noting the value of "images" for the evaluation of
legal rules).
19. The "status quo bias" refers to the tendency of parties to accept conditions consis-
tent with the way things are; so that, for example, parties are more likely to accept a
proposed contractual term if it is described as the default rule. See Russell Korobkin, The
Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 608, 612 (1998).
20. I use "proprietary" to refer to a product that is materially differentiated from com-
petitive products either through the protection of patent, copyright, trademark or trade secret
laws.
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C. A New Rubric: Transactional Risk Rather
Than Contract or Tort
1. The Commercial Context
Instead of focusing solely on a pass6 image of arm's length con-
tracts, the new commercial statute should address the reality of
bargaining failure. That reality is the failure of both parties to address an
issue as part of their "dickered terms" and/or their failure to provide a
commercially fair and just resolution after the problem occurs. For it is
a business reality, one that Karl Llewellyn would recognize if he were
alive today, that business people-as opposed to lawyers or drafters-
do not expect boilerplate provisions to resolve issues, and do not expect
them to govern unanticipated problems. 1
The business context is quickly sketched. Large and small busi-
nesses enter into innumerable UCITA transactions in which they do not
consciously allocate the risks surrounding the "product" if it fails to per-
form to their expectations. That they act this way, even in a culture
dominated by designed obsolescence, frightful waste, and rampant re-
fusal to accept responsibility, should not be surprising. Commercial
actors ignore risks because conscious allocation is too time-consuming
for simple transactions or beyond the transactor's cognitive limits in
more complex deals.
Even sophisticated businesses that regularly acquire "computer in-
formation" products cannot fully evaluate the performance
characteristics of increasingly complex technology, the risks of per-
formance failure, or the probable resulting monetary losses. It is
possible to construct performance risk forecasts, but the models require
so many assumptions that only the naYve believe that the resulting pro-
jections are little more than guesses. In short, the transactional costs of
investigating performance risks and negotiating contractual terms are
seldom worth the candle. And when they are, we can expect the parties
to negotiate, not to rely on forms. In this world, when the parties resort
to form contracts, allocating performance risk through notions of pre-
sumed assent and manufactured intention amounts to sheer delusion.
Thus, contrary to the repeated assertion of the Conference, the issue
is not "contract" and the need is not for a "contract statute." Instead, we
are in a no-man's land between the regimes of contract and tort. Just as
community life goes on regardless of where governments draw political
boundaries, commerce continues regardless of where courts and legis-
latures draw their conceptual lines. The commercial need for legislation,
21. Zamir, supra note 16, at 1765-66 and 1771-76 (1997).
[Vol. 7:1
Performance Risk, Form Contracts and UCITA
if there is one as the Conference claims, is for rules to be applied when
(1) there is a claim that a product has not performed; and (2) there has
been no actual (as opposed to constructive) meeting of the minds on
what performance obligation the licensor undertook or what remedies
the licensee should have to compensate for any failure of performance.
I do not address here the issue whether legislation is the best means
of dealing with this issue or whether uniform legislation is appropriate
at this time. Rather, I limit my conclusion to the following: if legislation
is enacted, it should cast aside the historic legal pigeonholes of contract
and tort, and instead should create obligations and remedies based on
the characteristics of the transaction, except to the extent that the parties
actually negotiate to the contrary.22 The two key determinants of risk
allocation should be (1) that a particular risk of performance should fall
on the transactor that can best bear or spread the risk of loss; and
(2) that the protected transactor should have an economical remedy for
fairly enforcing that risk allocation.
2. Why not the UCITA Default Rules?
Why draft a whole new statute to address performance risk? UCITA
includes carefully drafted majoritarian default rules which we are as-
sured represent the prevailing commercial practices in UCITA
transactions. The obvious solution, then, is to declare that form con-
tracts are unenforceable and that the UCITA gap-fillers apply. Four
closely related reasons why I reject that solution follow:2
3
1. UCITA incorporates too much from Article 2 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code. Those rules cannot shake their old-
economy genetic code. They are based too much on com-
mon-law, formalistic judicial notions inconsistent with
modem risk allocation principles.
2. UCITA's default rules are not sufficiently explicit regarding
the role of risk management in assigning liability and de-
termining damages. The explicit freedom of contract
philosophy of UCITA will sustain a status quo bias that will
lead old school judges and lawyers to under-appreciate the
22. Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for
Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. Rnv. 683, 695 (1993) (describing these rules as "mutable"
rather than "mandatory"). In the terminology of Calabresi, Melarned and Craswell, they
would be "liability" rather than "property" rules. Craswell, supra note 16, at 2.
23. Conpare Craswell, supra note 16, at 32 (reaching a similar conclusion regarding
incorporation of default rules to replace terms to which a party has not consented); but see
UCITA § 112 cmt. 5, illus. 2 (2000) (stating that default rules should replace terms to which
the assenting party has not agreed).
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new practicalities of the information economy. They will
tend to continue to translate new problems to old images.24
3. UCITA's warranty terms are too lax. Its minimal warranty
standards, which are admittedly rooted in past law, do not
provide a sufficient threat of liability to induce producers to
efficiently incorporate product failure liabilities into pric-
ing. Therefore, individual end-users are left to absorb
randomly occurring losses from performance failures. That
result is simply not efficient.
4. UCITA does not include remedial provisions specially de-
signed to deal with the thorny issues of product
performance failures presented in UCITA transactions, es-
pecially given the increasing complexity of computer
networks and information databases. Explicit damage rules
are necessary to provide the incentives to licensors and li-
censees to be commercially reasonable in minimizing total
transactional risk rather than their own risk.
3. Why not the Restatement's "Reasonable Expectations" Rule?
A second natural alternative to the enforcement of form contracts
would be to adopt the "reasonable expectations" test of § 211(3) of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts." Section 211 of the Restatement
explicitly binds a form-taker whether or not she reads or knows of the
terms."" Subsection (3) knocks out any term, however, that the form-
giver should expect that the form-taker would reject if the form-taker
were aware of it.27 This standard is called the "reasonable expectations"
rule, although the section invites confusion as to whose expectations are
relevant.'8 In fact, one could argue that there are three relevant
"expecters:" the actual form-taker, the hypothetical reasonable form-
taker and the form-giver.29
24. We can expect somewhat of the same effect that occurred during the period when
the UCC was being considered by the states. Initial opposition to the need for new ap-
proaches melted away as intervening judicial decisions made the UCC solutions seem
provident. See Towle, The Politics of Licensing Law, 36 Hous. L. REv. 121, 121-133
(1999). The difference here is that I do not believe that UCITA goes far enough to adapt to
new images. Its conservatism regarding form transactions will only exacerbate inefficient
results.




29. James J. White, Consumer Protection and the Uniform Commercial Code: Fonn
Contracts Under Revised Article 2, 75 WASH. U.L.Q. 315, 352-53 (1997).
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I reject § 211(3) as a replacement for UCITA's formula for three
simple reasons. First, as White demonstrates, its history does little to
commend it." Section 211(3) has not been employed extensively in
commercial transactions. Instead, it has been used most often in con-
sumer insurance cases and most often by an activist appellate judge in
Arizona.3 Second, the test merely invites covert action by courts since it
is prone to ex post rationalization in light of the actual turn of events
regardless of the ex ante probability of the event.32 Third and most fun-
damentally, the rule is under-inclusive with respect to the factors that
support non-enforcement of the terms. It is not just the presence of the
term that creates the inefficient result. Indeed, a lack of consent and in-
efficiency is much more likely to be the result of imperfect information,
cognitive limitations and/or transactional costs. In short, recourse to
"reasonable expectations" would create more problems than it would
solve.
D. Transactional Risk: Defining the Performance Obligation
The transactional risk management approach suggested here re-
quires an explication of the concepts of "performance obligation" and
"performance remedy." Before proceeding to that discussion, however,
the reader who is not familiar with UCITA transactions-most com-
monly software licenses and information access contracts-may wish to
consider the following two hypothetical cases, which should put the is-
sues in context.
1. The Software License
The success and growth of Holly, Orbison & Ely ("HOE"), a civil
engineering firm in Lubbock, Texas led it to upgrade its separate time-
keeping and billing software programs that could only handle 20 users.
Jennings, HOE's office manager, purchased from Minit-Paid Corp. for
$9,000 a 25-year, 30-user license for time and expense accounting and
billing software. The magazine ads for the software stated the program
was "Windows 98 Compatible," the "most advanced time management
software available for mid-sized professional firms" and "top-rated" by
ProTech Review. Moreover, the sales representative of the program re-
seller told Jennings that other accounting, legal and engineering firms in
town had installed the program without a hitch in less than an hour and
that they were running it successfully with no substantive problems.
30. Id.
31. Id. passim.
32. Id. at 349-52.
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HOE's computer network, however, crashed when its in-house
computer specialist attempted to install the program-making the net-
work inoperable for six hours. When that problem was solved, HOE
began using the program. At the end of the first month, however, the
program was unable to produce consolidated billing records for those
matters on which more than one engineer worked. This glitch required
accounting personnel to work sixteen hours of overtime to create HOE's
invoices for those matters and to properly credit the engineers for time
worked.
Jennings, embarrassed over the debacle, considers what remedy
HOE might have for the substantial out-of pocket losses in installation
costs and processing timesheets and invoices. He would also like to re-
coup some of the lost income from the network crash and the late
billings. When he reads, for the first time, the "clickwrap" license
agreement that appeared as the first screen after the computer specialist
commenced the installation process, he notes the following terms:
* There are no express warranties, except that the CD is free
from defects in workmanship and materials;
" All implied warranties are disclaimed;
" The licensor's sole liability to the licensee, whether in tort
or in breach of contract, is limited to replacement of the CD
within five days after return by the licensee of the original
CD;
" The licensor is not liable for consequential or incidental
damages;
" No written or oral representations or statements made prior
to the purchase are part of the agreement between the par-
ties;
* The licensee agrees not to issue any review of the product,
including adverse comments to other actual or potential li-
censees, without the licensor's consent; and
" Any claims against the licensor are subject to arbitration
under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce,
must be commenced in Massachusetts and are governed by
Massachusetts law. Moreover, the only issue before the ar-
bitrators shall be whether the licensor complied with the
limited replacement remedy.
Naturally, the specialist had clicked on the "I agree" dialog box
without reading the program so that she could complete the installation
(Vol. 7:1
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before lunch. The program would not have permitted the installation
process to continue if she had not. In light of these provisions, Jennings
concludes that the cost of investigating the cause of the problems and
retaining an attorney to contest the license agreement far exceeds the
cost of the software, the lost time and the lost income.
Unknown to Jennings, the compilation function of the program
would have worked fine if information had been entered directly into
the program. Most of HOE's employees, however, were maintaining
their time records on a common (but not market-dominant) spreadsheet
program and then "cutting and pasting" the information into the time-
keeping program. Internal formatting information from the spreadsheet
program that was picked up in the "cutting" step interfered with the
time-keeping function's ability to recognize and transfer that data to the
composite billing function. The software documentation did not indicate
that such a practice would create problems.
2. The Information Access License
Geodata Systems provides computerized geographic and demo-
graphic information to a variety of customers through access to a
database of layered graphical maps coded by zip codes or census tracts
with the information requested by the customer. For example, the cus-
tomer can order a map that color codes metropolitan areas according to
rankings based on zoning; population characteristics including income,
race, ethnic origin and education; transportation and utility information;
local real property and tax records; presence of retail chains; number of
churches and libraries; and a myriad of other factors. Customers can
visit Geodata's website, identify a geographic area and the information
they desire regarding that area. Geodata will then create a layered
graphical map coded for each type of information requested.
The cost of the access license varies according to projected usage
and the number of component databases that the user may access. Geo-
data's standard license agreement describes the product offered as
"geographic information systems derived from sources deemed reliable
by Geodata." The agreement disclaims any responsibility for the accu-
racy of any data obtained from third parties or the accuracy of the maps
themselves. It also includes a standard integration clause, a disclaimer
of all express and implied warranties, an exclusive remedy of an exten-
sion of access for six months, and a denial of liability for incidental and
consequential damages. No information is provided on the site about the
details of the sources of the underlying data.
Spacechain, an Internet service provider, has been using Geodata in-
formation for the last year to plan its mail distribution of disks offering
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its service. Spacechain has developed its own criteria for ranking mar-
kets based on various economic and social factors and uses Geodata to
match its criteria to markets around the country. Spacechain maintains
records on the response rate of its mailings according to its internal
market rankings. Generally, response rates correlate very highly with
rankings. However, Spacechain has just noticed that the correlation
between ranking and response has been markedly different for the State
of Michigan. After considerable investigation, Spacechain has learned
that Geodata stopped adding new information to the database from state
and local agencies in Michigan after prices for that information were
dramatically increased two years ago.
Spacechain has paid Geodata $65,000 for Michigan maps and has
spent $350,000 in mailings to Michigan over the last two years. It esti-
mates that the lower response rate compared to other states has cost it
$6.6 million in lost revenue. Spacechain signed Geodata's standard li-
cense agreement after negotiating the price, the number of simultaneous
users and number of databases to which it would have access. It did not
negotiate any other terms of the transaction after being told that the
sales staff did not have the authority to change the terms. Geodata's rep-
resentative did tell Spacechain's buyer, "We've never let this stuff
interfere with a good relationship, and we've never enforced any of this
boilerplate."
Spacechain has demanded that Geodata credit Spacechain for the
amount spent on Michigan maps, reimburse it for its other losses, and
warrant that the rest of the database to which Spacechain has access
contains the most recently available data. Geodata has cited the dis-
claimer in the license agreement and the provision denying any liability
for incidental and consequential damages. Spacechain responds that the
disclaimer cannot be deemed to permit it to offer obviously stale infor-
mation. But Geodata's rejoinder is simple, "Our researchers concluded
that Michigan's demographics have not changed substantially enough to
make the information unreliable for all purposes, and our agreement
disclaims any warranty of fitness for a particular purpose."
3. Product Definition v. Performance Obligation
The two hypotheticals demonstrate the nature of the performance
risk problem. In each, the licensee has not gained the benefits expected,
perhaps reasonably, from the license.33 In neither of the cases did the
parties knowingly allocate the risk of the particular performance failure
33. This is not the same as saying that the licensor failed to perform or breached a war-
ranty.
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involved. Can we conclude, therefore, that the licensee therefore ac-
cepted all risks not expressly or customarily accepted by the licensor?
UCITA would say so. But is risk allocation a question of contract alone,
or is there something else at work here?
One way to resolve this risk allocation issue would be to look first
to what is being licensed. As UCITA's Prefatory Note states, a signifi-
cant attribute of products in UCITA transactions is that the product is
often defined solely by reference to the licensing agreement.' A toaster
can be described separately from an agreement to sell it, but a license to
use a software program cannot be defined simply by reference to a
computer disk or the contents of the disk. Nevertheless, many aspects of
the definition of the licensed product (number of users, location of use,
term, rights to reverse engineer or modify) are unrelated to how the
product performs. In other words, the seeming specificity of licensing
agreements as to product description (hence "specifications") may shed
little light on the performance obligation.
For example, the Minit-Paid transaction seems to have an explicit
description of the product being licensed-a CD, which a computer with
described specifications could read, that contains a program that per-
forms some sort of time-keeping and invoice creation functions that can
be used by up to 30 users for a 25 year term. The very nature of transac-
tion, however, demonstrates that precise contours of the product's
performance are not established in the agreement. It is far from self-
evident that customers would pay $9,000 to purchase what the form lit-
erally provides: a series of options to acquire CDs until one is
sufficiently non-defective to allow the computer to read and perform
some sort of time-keeping and billing functions. The form description
does not answer the question of how what is being licensed will accom-
plish the purposes for which Minit-Paid designed the program and for
which HOE licensed it. We know that a toaster is expected to produce
edible toast in a reasonably consistent and timely fashion. But what,
precisely, is the software to do? Is it software that will install without
causing the network to crash and handle time-keeping for the maximum
number of licensees without glitch or is it just a program that gets a li-
censee most of the way there most of the time?35
Similarly, in the Geodata case, the form undoubtedly specifies what
is being licensed, but there is substantially less information as to how
34. Prefatory Note, supra note 3.
35. Thus, it is often said that it is impossible to design software of any complexity, es-
pecially software that will run with other programs, that does not have bugs. I believe that it
is safe to say we do not have that same perception of toasters or of most other goods' im-
ages.
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the product is to perform. Was the mapping component the primary
feature (value) or is the underlying data just as important? Does the li-
cense just allow access to whatever happens to be "in" the database at
any given time? Or does the licensor have some inherent obligation to
make the information both accessible to its customers and reliable for
their uses?36
This distinction between product definition and performance obli-
gation reflects the differing interests of the form-giver licensor and the
form-taker licensee. The form-giver licensor is very interested in mak-
ing sure that the form does not provide any more rights than the licensee
is paying for. On the other hand, it has little interest in delineating the
performance requirements of that product since setting a performance
standard can create a potential liability that its warranty disclaimers and
other exculpatory provisions would otherwise avoid. Moreover, because
the licensee has no input into the terms, missing from the form's de-
scription of the product is any reflection of the form-taker's
expectations regarding precise performance characteristics.37
The one-sided terms of form performance standards should come as
no surprise given the parties' relative access to relevant performance
data. These information disparities are of two types. The first, but less
significant, is that the parties do not have equal access at equal cost to
information about how the form document purports to allocate risks and
the effectiveness of those allocations. The second disparity is that the
parties do not have equal access at equal cost to information about the
actual value of those risks (probability times damage) and as to the cost
of risk avoidance or transfer.
For example, licensors Minit-Paid and Geodata have the following
term-related information advantages: (a) they already know what the
form contract says; (b) they know whether, in the event of a perform-
ance problem, they will accommodate the licensee's complaint or rely
on the form; and (c) they have in all likelihood obtaihed legal advice as
36. As we shall see in Part n1, under UCITA this definitional issue matters little in form
transactions because, regardless of how the product is defined, the standard disclaimers of
performance are enforced and the customer loses. The result is certain, so UCITA's stated
objective is achieved, but there is no certainty as far as the user's ex ante evaluation of risk is
concerned. UCITA's effect on ex ante certainty, therefore, is one-sided.
37. UCITA seems to acknowledge that the form-giver is not required to meet a mini-
mum performance obligation. See infra text accompanying note 134. In this regard, Towle
agrees that "minimum quality is fundamental to commercial expectations." See Holly Towle,
No Good Deed Goes Unpunished, The 2B Guide (2000), available at http:ll
www.2bguide.com/docslberkht.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2001). Towle does not, however,
indicate whether UCITA requires such minimum quality or how it would be defined in the
form non-negotiated transaction. Id. Whether competitive forces will impose a minimal per-
formance obligation is discussed infra Part I.A.
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to the probable judicial treatment of the terms. They also enjoy decided
advantages as to the performance characteristics of their products, espe-
cially if they keep records of beta test results and customer complaints.
Finally, their control over product design, production and distribution
allows them to spread costs over a larger number of events and thereby
provides substantial advantages in reducing the risks of performance
problems, resolving problems and spreading the losses that do occur.
These disparities mean that licensees HOE and Spacechain would
have to incur substantial transactional costs to reach informational eq-
uity with their licensors so that they could price the form terms. Unless
the price and risk reductions that could be achieved by acquiring that
information exceed the costs of obtaining that information (or confirms
that the terms of the transaction are otherwise favorable), neither the
licensees nor society can be confident that bargaining will reach effi-
cient results.
In sum, absent an ex ante statement of performance obligation, we
are left with determining ex post which transactor was in a better posi-
tion to bear the particular loss actually experienced. Only then can we
back into the judgment that an efficient (bargained) exchange would
have included that performance definition or obligation.
E. Transactional Risk: Enforcing the Performance Obligation
Allocation of the performance risk, however, is only one part of the
conundrum presented by the above hypotheticals. The other part is how
to enforce an allocation of risk to the licensor when the loss from that
risk is deemed to fall on the licensee. In the illustrated scenarios, en-
forcing the form terms would mean that the licensee bears the risk of the
licensors' failure to meet any performance obligations they had as-
sumed. Moreover, the in terrorem intent of the form greatly reduces the
likelihood that form-takers will even try to enforce a performance obli-
gation.
There is nothing in the statement of either hypothetical that makes it
self-evident, from the viewpoint of the parties or of society, that a licen-
see should be barred from enforcing an otherwise optimal allocation of
risk. Certainly, there is no evidence of actual bargaining as to remedies,
so the "contract" language is only one piece of the puzzle. If we con-
clude that a statute should allocate to the licensor responsibility for the
performance breakdowns in the hypotheticals, it certainly does not fol-
low that the licensor should be able contractually to preclude the
licensee from enforcing that allocation, at least in the absence of real
consent. To the contrary, it would seem to follow that un-bargained-
for limitations on remedies should not eviscerate the statutory risk
2000-20011
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allocations. To the extent that UCITA adopts such an outcome, one
would expect the Conference to offer a cogent explanation of its rea-
sons. Unfortunately, it does not.
F. A Road Map
This Article is limited to UCITA's treatment of performance prob-
lems in the context of form contracts used in transactions between
commercial (i.e. non-consumer) parties. Part II will describe the schol-
arship regarding form contracts in particular-scholarship that
apparently has been rejected or ignored by the Conference. Part II also
analyzes whether shrinkwraps and clickwraps, as prototypical UCITA
contracts, present any particular basis for rejecting scholarly analysis.
Part III examines in detail the most relevant provisions of UCITA
and the Official Comments supporting those provisions. True to its
word, UCITA's formalistic freedom of contract approach would enforce
standardized contractual terms regarding performance obligations and
remedies, despite any empirical basis for finding a meeting of the minds
or any persuasive demonstration that presumed assent is consistent with
public norms.
Part IV explains an approach that focuses on risk bearing and
spreading and demonstrates why that approach is more efficient and
fair. I present a model statute that would implement such an approach.
The statute breaks down the problem into five parts: definitions, specifi-
cation of product performance standards, tests for determining whether
those standards were met, remedies for performance failure, and a de-
ferred effective date. I then apply UCITA and the model statute to the
foregoing hypothetical cases to analyze the difference in outcomes and
incentives. I conclude Part IV with a consideration of how the model
statute would have applied if Y2K had lived up to its billings, and how
it might affect innovation in information technology.
I. PERFORMANCE PROBLEMS AND
FORM-CONTRACT TERMS
A. Form Terms Defined
The threshold issue is defining "form terms." I will use the term
here to describe a commonplace but very specific transaction:
" a set of standard "contractual" terms
• in written or electronic format
• prepared by one party (the form-giver)
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* for use as the standard terms in commercial transactions as
to which it is a party
" presented to the other party (the form-taker) in circum-
stances where the parties do not in fact negotiate the terms,
and
where the form-giver has no reasonable expectation that the
typical form-taker would incur the costs necessary to evalu-
ate the terms and their value/costs to the form-taker.
Thus, the paradigm transaction is one where the form-giver cannot
reasonably expect an economically rational form-taker to obtain and
evaluate all the information necessary (1) to calculate the legal, techni-
cal and economic risks of performance; (2) value accurately the prices
of those performance terms; and (3) negotiate substitute contractual
terms to allocate those risks. 8
Crucial to this analysis, it is worth restatement that a "form con-
tract" means a non-negotiated set of "contract terms" where the
reasonable form-giver would expect that the form-taker would be re-
quired to incur irrational transactional costs to make an informed
(efficient) consent to the terms. I do not include within the scope of the
concept any term that the parties actually negotiate. For example, if the
parties negotiate the terms of a warranty, the warranty provisions and
the remedies for breach of warranty would not be included within the
concept of "form terms."
UCITA itself has a slightly different definition:
"Standard form" means a record or a group of related records
containing terms prepared for repeated use in transactions and
so used in a transaction in which there was no negotiated
change of terms by individuals except to set the price, quantity,
method of payment, selection among standard options, or time
or method of delivery.39
This definition differs from mine in two primary ways. First,
UCITA permits negotiation only on specified terms: if the parties go
beyond those terms, for example to negotiate a longer notice period be-
fore acceptance or waiver of rights, then the entire contract falls out of
38. The price of the term to the form-taker is the present discounted value of the costs
the form-taker would incur over the life of the transaction as a result of the term less the
present discounted value of the value of the reduction in price or other consideration, if any,
received from the form-giver in exchange for acceptance of the term. See Meyerson, supra
note 13, at 590-91.
39. UCITA § 102(61).
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the definition." My definition focuses on the non-negotiated nature of
specific terms or issues because the fact that the parties negotiate a
matter of immediate concern with a high probability of occurrence does
not mean that they will or should rationally negotiate provisions on
more contingent events such as performance breakdowns. This conclu-
sion follows from the fact that, in UCITA transactions, material product
performance disputes are relatively rare.
Second, and more importantly, the UCITA definition does not in-
clude my last element, that the form-giver must not have a reasonable
expectation that the form-taker can evaluate the term accurately."' This
element is crucial to properly limit special treatment of form terms to
those transactions where the information costs and obstacles are suffi-
cient to create a high probability of an inefficient bargain. Because
UCITA approaches the whole problem from a different perspective-
caveat form-taker-it does not include that element.
Note that my definition and UCITA's do not incorporate many of
the factors cited in discussions of standardized contracts. Neither defi-
nition turns on the relative size of the parties, their relative bargaining
power, the size of the print, or the complexity of the transaction or the
form language. It doesn't matter whether the form-taker actually read
the form or whether the form-giver made the terms at issue conspicuous
or pointed them out to the form-taker, or even whether there was a
"take-it-or-leave-it" aspect to the transaction.4" These are all aspects of
what are commonly called contracts of adhesion. The image of such
contracts generally relates to consumer transactions with fine print
forms and subjects like insurance, mortgages and durable goods pur-
chases. Such concepts add little to the debate about the enforceability of
forms in the commercial context, and I eschew them here.4 ' As Towle
makes clear, in the information economy even consumers have, or will
soon have, the ability to be form-givers, and the investigation into the
relative bargaining power of a dot.com e-commerce site and a licensee
of free software would be fruitless.' Thus, the primary determinant is
the bar that information costs create to informed assent.
Neither UCITA nor I find any pejorative connotation to follow as a
matter of course from form terms. They are a rational product of any
business which produce substantial benefits for all parties. Thus, form
40. See UCITA § 102 cmt. 53.
41. UCITA § 102(61).
42. UCITA § 102 cmt. 53. Official Comment 53's reference to an opportunity to bar-
gain makes it clear that even open disclosure is not enough to take a form out of the
definition unless there is really a commercially significant reason to bargain. See id.
43. See Nimmer, supra note 6, at 23; White, supra note 29.
44. See Towle, Politics, supra note 24, at 149.
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terms may include provisions that are solely in the form-taker's favor
(e.g. a money back guarantee) as well as those solely in the form-giver's
favor (a disclaimer of warranty). They may or may not have been taken
into account by the form-giver in setting product price or features. They
do not imply any overreaching, fraudulent, deceptive or unfair trade
practices. They are neither necessarily inefficient nor unfair. When any
of these unfavorable elements is present, doctrines of unconscionability
or conflict with public policy may come into play, but I will assume in
this article that both parties are acting as rational economic players, just
as society would want them to act. In short, it is the not the existence of
form performance terms, but their random impact that creates the prob-
lem.
B. The Scholarly Analysis
Now we can turn to the question of whether form terms should be
enforced. There is little new about the doctrinal issues presented by
form contracts. The crux of the matter is the fact that the parties' trans-
action includes as one aspect a set of contractual terms presented by one
party as its "standard" terms of doing business and the other party does
not contest the inclusion (imposition) of those terms. The issues created
by this situation were extensively considered by Llewellyn45 and have
been thoroughly analyzed by Slawson in 1971, Rakoff in 1983, and Eis-
enberg in 1982 and 1995, to name but a few.46
1. Llewellyn's Approach
Llewellyn acknowledged that the notion of mutual assent to form
terms was a fiction, but he emphasized the necessity of enforcing the
dickered bargain. While this portion of his analysis was undoubtedly
correct, Rakoff has shown that Llewellyn implicitly recognized that the
case for enforcing all terms-and especially "contingent" or "invisible"
terms such as those dealing with performance and remedies-was not
nearly as strong.4s In other words, while Llewellyn could be understood
to have adopted the position that a form-taker "must take the good with
45. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370-
371 (Little, Brown, and Company 1960), analyzed in Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1198-1206, as
Llewellyn's" 'true answer to the whole problem.'"
46. See supra note 16.
47. See LLE\VELLYN, supra note 45, at 370-71, analyzed in Rakoff, supra note 2, at
1198-1206; see also Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1198 n. 91 (noting that Llewellyn wrote about
the subject of consent in form transactions at least six times).
48. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1199-1206.
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the bad,"49 the result could not be justified under generally accepted no-
tions of efficiency or justice. Thus, even UCC Article 2, clearly
Llewellyn's brainchild, does not impose a pure duty to read/enforce all
forms, but adopts a layered approach to contracting among merchants
based on reasonable presumptions of assent.0
2. More Recent Analyses of Presumed Consent
More recently, scholars such as Slawson, Rakoff and Eisenberg
have developed a more consistent analysis demonstrating why a doc-
trine of presumed intent should not be used to enforce form contracts.
An amalgam of the various analyses would proceed along the following
lines:5
The basic premise of contract law is that the public justice
system should enforce bargains only if (and because) the
defendant has consented to the obligation/forbearance the
plaintiff seeks to enforce. 2 Thus, it has been widely ac-
knowledged both by traditional doctrinalists53 and by law-
and economics-theorists54 that there is no just basis for the
application of contract law absent actual or presumed as-
sent.
" In a partially completed transaction (i.e., the licensee has
received the product or access to it) the fact that a party has
not negotiated specific terms or even read the contract does
not preclude recognition that a contract exists.5 Form con-
tracts promote efficiency by reducing transaction costs that
would otherwise be incurred to negotiate and document
routine (at least from the viewpoint of the form-giver)
transactions. They are also supported by notions of justice
49. White, supra note 29, at 321 (quoting 47 A.L.I. PRoc. 528 (1970), comments of Mr.
Willard).
50. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-207; M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., No.
67796-4, 2000 Wash. LEXIS 287 (Wash. May 4, 2000); Eisenberg, Cognition, supra note 1,
at 245.
51. The following synthesis is not intended to reflect the views of any single commen-
tator. The citations are exemplary and not exhaustive. However, in-depth analysis of each of
the cited articles would unduly delay getting to my point. The reader with interest in the
underlying analysis will profit greatly by reading the articles cited.
52. See Craswell, supra note 16, at 5; Eisenberg, Bargain, supra note 16, at 742-48;
Slawson, supra note 16, at 542-43, 552.
53. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Bargain, supra note 16, at 742-748.
54. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CON-
TRACT LAW 4-5 (1979).
55. See Eisenberg, Bargain, supra note 16, at 764-65.
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in that the form-giver has parted with value in the transac-
tion, and her reliance should be protected.
Recognition, however, of an enforceable agreement's exis-
tence, to the extent of the dickered bargain, does not
necessarily mean that each term of the form contract should
be enforced. 6 The traditional duty to read the contract was
merely a control principle to preclude the form-taker from
avoiding bargains that had appeared to be advantageous ex
ante but proved ex post not to be so great No public policy
supports that duty when the form-giver could not reasona-
bly expect that the form terms were read, understood or
assented to.57
" In short, it should be irrelevant whether a form-taker actu-
ally reads, understands or fails to negotiate a form term,
because the essential purpose of the form is to avoid the ne-
cessity of negotiation and documentation." To impose a
duty to read a contract that the form-giver does not want to
negotiate, probably has not authorized its employees to ne-
gotiate, and has not relied upon, would unjustifiably extend
the duty to read.59
* Indeed, lawyers and economists argue: (1) only a contract
that involves an actual meeting of the minds will create a
value-maximizing exchange 6° and (2) contracts will produce
efficient results only if the form-taker has the information
necessary to price each contract term by comparing the dis-
counted present value of the future "service stream" it will
receive from the product and the discounted present value
of the sum of outlays over time for purchase, maintenance,
repair, and rights enforcement.61
56. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1181-83.
57. See id.; see also White, supra note 29, at 324 (recognizing that the duty to read is
only a fiction imposed to facilitate commerce, even though White stands as a staunch de-
fender of the duty to read).
58. See Eisenberg, Bargain, supra note 16, at 765-66; Eisenberg, Cognition, supra note
1, at 244-48.
59. See KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 54, 5 (noting that the "objective assent rule"
can be justified by the need to prevent people from misleading others from thinking they
have a contract); see also Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1220-29. In the form context, there is no
basis for such a misleading implication in regard to any specific invisible term.
60. See KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 54, at 5.
61. See Meyerson, supra note 13, at 590-91.
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Thus, when the issue is limited to non-negotiated terns of
form contracts where there is no basis for a finding of actual
assent to the particular term (as opposed to the transaction
in its entirety), enforceability of that term must turn on
whether assent to the specific term can be inferred or im-
plied.62 The only basis for such a factual inference would be
when the term is one that a rational person would have
agreed to if she (a) had considered it and (b) had the infor-
mation to properly evaluate both the meaning of the term
and the present value or cost of the term if it were en-
forced.63 In that case, enforcement would be efficient and
consistent with concepts of both consumer sovereignty and
social welfare maximization. 4
So far, the analysis would conclude that the common law
should enforce form terms against a form-taker when the
term would have been favorable or neutral ex ante. Thus, a
form-taker cannot take advantage of the lack of actual as-
sent to "second guess" a bargain in light of ex post
outcomes.65
* On the other hand, it follows that there is no reason to en-
force terms that could only benefit form-givers ex ante.
Such terms are inefficient (would not be agreed to by a ra-
tional person with full knowledge of the term and its present
value) and assent therefore cannot be implied.66 The re-
maining uncertainty is how to handle terms where the ex
ante risk is unknowable by the form-taker because informa-
tion, other transaction costs or cognitive limitations make
knowledge uneconomical.
* The form term is no more than the biased risk allocation by
the form-giver and is entitled to no presumption of enforce-
ability. Since the question of contract vel non is determined
by the partially executed nature of the transaction, the stat-
62. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1195; Slawson, supra note 16, at 542-43.
63. See Slawson, supra note 16, at 556.
64. See David McGowan, Free Contracting, Fair Competition, and Article 2B: Some
Reflections on Federal Competition Policy, Information Transactions, and "Aggressive
Neutrality," 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1173, 1214 (1998); Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1228.
65. To this extent, the "modem" analysis is true to the historical context of the duty to
read rule. See, Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1184 et seq. (discussing Lewis v. Great Western Ry.,
5 H.&N. 867, 157 Eng. Rep. 1427 (Ex 1860)).
66. See Eisenberg, Cognition, supra note 1, at 243-44; Zamir, supra note 16, at 1790-
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ute should enforce the contract according to the dickered
terms along with "default rules" that reflect the legislature's
views as to generally efficient outcomes." This is preferable
to an open-ended default rule that would delegate absolute
discretion to the court in individual cases because the leg-
islature is in a better position than a court to determine
efficiency"
An argument could be made that the form terms should be
enforced if the form-giver demonstrates that the term is
consistent with trade custom in negotiated transactions, be-
cause trade customs may be presumed to reflect efficiency.69
Even terms generally accepted in the trade, however, may
be inefficient. Terms can be presumed efficient only if the
standard assumptions of the modem free-market economics
model are satisfied." Those assumptions include (1) that all
parties have complete information regarding all relevant
facts (risks); and (2) transaction costs are minimal. When
the form term is one that is beyond the form-taker's cogni-
tive capability or rational boundary,1 these assumptions
cannot be satisfied, and there is no reason to give weight to
the customary term.72 Such cognitive problems are espe-
cially significant in complex transactions where forms
include many terms, where the transaction is not routine for
the form-taker and where the terms deal with future contin-
gencies. 3 These issues suggest that performance terms
based on "uninformed" trade usage may not provide effi-
cient results in negotiated transactions, and certainly will
not do so in form transactions.74
67. Compare Craswell, supra note 16, at 6.
68. Craswell, supra note 16, at 38-9 (noting that courts have "greater institutional ex-
pertise").
69. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1283 n. 335.
70. See Meyerson, supra note 13, at 585-93 (presenting an excellent introduction to the
economic model used by law-and-economics commentators).
71. See Eisenberg, Cognition, supra note 1, at 240-42.
72. See id.
73. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW § 6.6 (4th ed. 1992).
Even if the costs of reading and understanding the legal effect of the terms are minimal (as it
would be for "merchant" licensees who both expect and understand the typical warranty
disclaimers and remedies limitations), it does not follow that the cost of becoming informed
as to the implications of those terms for this product are low. See Croley & Hanson, supra
note 22, at 770-71.
74. See R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability of an
Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L. J. 635 (1996), for a
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In sum, synthesis of scholarly comment reveals that form terms
should not be enforced because there is no basis for concluding that they
are the product of informed consent (a meeting of the minds) or cogni-
tive risk-taking.
A responsive argument could be made that the form-taker's failure
to negotiate the terms demonstrates a willingness to gamble on whatever
risk allocation is proposed in the form. This seems to be the perspective
of the duty to read adherents. But the law should not infer that a form-
taker is gambling because there is another, more logical explanation: far
from gambling, the form-taker is acting rationally within the limits of
cognition.75 Therefore, no form-giver would be justified in relying on an
assumption of risk acceptance because the form-taker's conduct is en-
tirely consistent with her desire to avoid transactional costs-costs
which would only reduce the net value ultimately transferred to the
form-taker in the vast majority of cases where performance is not a
material problem. 76 From society's viewpoint, there appears to be no
justification for encouraging one party to incur irrational transaction
costs just because the other party has sought to impose inefficient
terms.77 The essence of the analysis that form terms should not be en-
forced under a contract theory, then, is that any presumed assent by a
form-giver is not sufficiently related to economic efficiency or justice
considerations to justify public enforcement.78
discussion of the literature regarding the effect of imperfect information on the bargaining
process and on the efficiency of resulting transactions. As Cruz and Hinck demonstrate,
those downplaying the effects of imperfect information have greatly over-estimated the im-
pact of the minority of shoppers who care about invisible terms. Id. The image used by those
skeptical commentators is at least implicitly one limited to shopping for contractual terms
themselves in the context of fairly simple products. Cruz and Hinck's conclusions, therefore,
would hold a fortiori for technologically complex products where the purchaser would have
even less ability to obtain and understand data regarding performance characteristics, risk of
default, and potential consequential damages. Id. In other words, those tending to believe
that form-takers would not be harmed by imperfect information could be dealing with one of
Nimmer's outdated images.
75. See Eisenberg, Cognition, supra note 1, at 243-44.
76. Again, form terms are relevant in a commercial sense only in those few cases where
there has been (1) a performance breakdown; and (2) a resort to the legal documentation is
necessary to resolve a dispute regarding responsibility and/or amount of loss.
77. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkivrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L.
Rev. 1239, 1287 (1995).
78. See Lon. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Dam-
ages, 46 YALE. L. J. 52,56-57 (1936).
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C. Shrinkwraps and Clickwraps:
A Form by Any Other Name?
Shrinkwraps and clickwraps are but a special species of form
agreements. It is somewhat surprising that the question whether they
should be enforced according to their terms should have generated such
a substantial amount of commentary.79 This is especially so given the
limited number of cases that have addressed the issue.0 Much of this
commentary, however, can be explained by the novelty of the specific
terms or by the fact that the context for the discussion of enforceability
was the analysis of copyright and other intellectual property law issues.
Enforceability of contract terms is ancillary to the crux of those prob-
lems. That is, the issues are made more complex by the form terms, but
they are not dependent on those terms.81 Even the relatively few articles
that discuss form terms in the context of performance problems that
might arise in UCITA-type transactions generally leave the topic with-
out resolving the ultimate enforceability issue.2
Nevertheless, because the primary problems with form terms arise
from information disparities, the continued development of information
technology may suggest that shrinkwraps and clickwraps should be en-
forced for reasons that do not apply to traditional forms. It is therefore
worth addressing in some depth whether shrinkwraps and clickwraps do
79. See Lemley, supra note 77, 1248, 1263; Shah, supra note 9, at 90-91.
80. Commentators may inadvertently give the impression that precedent on either side
of the issue is both deeper and broader than it actually is. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, In-
tellectual Property and Contract Law for the Information Age: Foreword to a Symposium,
87 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 6 (1999) (stating that "contract cases generally have held"); Carlyle C.
Ring, Jr. & Raymond T. Nimmer, Series Of Papers On UCITA Issues, (August 1999), avail-
able at http://www.nccusl.orgluniformact-qanda/uniformacts-q-ucita.htm. There are actually
very few controlling precedents and hardly a sufficient sample to predict where the law will
eventually end up. As in other developing areas of state law, state courts of last resort are
notoriously independent of trends. See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., No. 99-2499-KHV,
2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9896 (D. Kan. June 16, 2000) (holding that terms of a shrinkwrap
delivered after the initial phone order do not become part of the contract). In any event, the
precedent issue is really beside the point since it is clear that both species of form contracts
are here to stay and that they are drafted as much for in terrorem effect as for enforceability.
Any doubts about the latter point can be resolved by asldng counsel to provide a formal legal
opinion as to the enforceability of a shrinkwrap or clickwrap.
81. See, generally, Lemley, supra note 77; McGowan, supra note 64. Maureen A.
O'Rourke, Progressing Toward a Uniform Commercial Code for Electronic Commerce or
Racing Toward Nonunformity, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 635 (1999); Samuelson, supra note
80, at 6.
82. See Alces, supra note 6, at 286-87; Nimmer, supra note 6, at 24; Towle, Politics,
supra note 24, at 153.
20001-2001]
28 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
present any unique issues of enforceability under the scholarly analy-
i.83
The issue is easily resolved with respect to shrinkwraps. Their dis-
tinctions from the run of the mill agreement are the timing of supposed
assent and their relationship to the licensing of intellectual property.
Shrinkwraps in and of themselves, however, present no unique issues
that favor enforcement. To the contrary, shrinkwraps present more ob-
stacles to enforcement under the basic analysis than traditional forms
since they are "reverse unilateral contracts"'8 at best and require an ex-
pansive view of "layered contracting" in order to be enforceable at all."
Clickwraps, however, present stronger arguments for enforcement
because their on-line nature allows both the form-giver and the form-
taker to take advantage of developing information technology to over-
come some of the information obstacles to presumed assent. There are
at least three factors that should be taken into account in analyzing this
issue.
1. Lower Information Costs
Examples of form contracts include parking lot tickets, insurance
contracts received after the premium is paid, and car rental agreements
shoved across the counter at the weary traveler. While there are also
harried parties to license transactions, clickwraps do not present the
same image of the time-constrained form-taker. For example, in In re
RealNetworks, the court enforced arbitration and choice of forum
clauses in a clickwrap in part because licensees could view the terms
and print them at leisure in the peace and quiet of their own homes. "
Information technology also has the potential for allowing form-
givers to increase dramatically disclosures to their form-takers. For ex-
ample, a clickwrap could include links to annotated forms that provide
supplemental explanations and pros and cons regarding particular
clauses, including even links to objective third party sites like licensees'
benevolent associations. Such developments could dramatically reduce
the current contractual information imbalance between the parties.
This is not to say, however, that the mere increased disclosure re-
garding contract terms should not make clickwraps enforceable as a
83. This article does not address form contracts involving the sale of computers gov-
erned by UCC Article 2. See, e.g., Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 16913, 2000 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 54 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16,2000); Klocek, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9896.
84. Lemley, supra note 77, at 1241-42.
85. See, e.g., M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., No. 67796-4, 2000
Wash. LEXIS 287 (Wash. May 4,2000).
86. See In re RealNetworks, Inc., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6584 (N.D. Ill.
May 11, 2000).
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matter of course. Commentators have rightly pointed out the prohibitive
cost imbalance between the parties in obtaining legal advice to analyze
form terms, but understanding the legal effect of the terms is just one
transactional cost. In a sense, it is the least important because most
commercial form-takers will understand the general effect even of
common non-dickered terms such as warranty disclaimers and remedies
limitations.
More significant are the costs of obtaining other information neces-
sary to "price" the term (i.e. information about other performance
disputes concerning the product). Even though internet and database
technologies should dramatically reduce those costs, we can expect that
form-givers, if provided with an enforcement incentive, would provide
such additional information themselves.88 For example, a form-giver
might include with its clickwrap a link to information on costs of arbi-
tration and even results in arbitrations involving the terms at issue. The
benefits of technology may be so great as to permit the growth of com-
petition in performance terms through sites that compare the forms of
different providers as well as product performance characteristics.89
These developments would be positive, but for three reasons they
are unlikely to solve the enforcement problem identified by scholars.
The first is that providing more information and disclosures does not
eliminate transaction costs but only substitutes some costs (hopefully
lower) for others. Even relatively small information costs may preclude
efficient decision-making if they are still significant in comparison to
the product cost. Second, there is such a thing as too much information.
Form-givers may be in a Catch-22: form terms will not be enforced if
there is too little information available to the form-taker, and they will
not be enforced if the information provided would exceed form-takers'
cognitive capacities by requiring study and comprehension beyond the
constraints of rationality. 90
87. Eisenberg, Cognition, supra note 1, at 243. For a thorough review of the arguments
pro and con on the issue of information costs in the product defect context, including a cri-
tique of leading scholarship, see Croley & Hanson, supra note 22, at 769 et seq.
88. Cf. Croley & Hanson, supra note 22, at 786 et seq. (suggesting that producers would
have an incentive to disclose performance risk information to customers without exculpatory
incentives if enterprise liability were imposed).
89. Product repair statistics such as those published by Consumer Reports would be an
example of the latter.
90. See Eisenberg, Cognition, supra note 1, at 244-48. This is especially true for prod-
ucts of any complexity because the form-taker has to investigate and value all potential
performance breakdowns before entering into the transaction. At least dealing with the issue
ex post, the parties only have to analyze the loss that actually occurred. Cruz and Hinck also
conclude that disclosure of information is not likely to create efficient terms: A particularly
salient problem with the disclosure argument is that people will generally not know ex ante
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Finally, advancements in information technology will not affect
form-givers' desire to maintain the confidentiality of proprietary infor-
mation. In the Minit-Paid hypothetical, the office manager could
efficiently evaluate whether to accept the performance terms only if he
knew the probability that an installation problem or multiple timekeeper
problem would occur. It is highly unlikely that the licensor would will-
ingly publish such competitor-sensitive information. Yet without such
information, there is little reason to believe that transactions on form
terms will be efficient.9
In sum, while information technology promises many advancements
that will make clickwraps more user friendly than our previous images
of form contracts, technology itself is unlikely to remove the basic ob-
jections to enforcement of form terms.
2. Product Differentiation and Complexity
A pillar of the scholarly objection to form terms is that an unrealis-
tic presumption of assent is inconsistent with the goal of economic
efficiency. In opposition, critics note that part of the "freedom of con-
tract" mantra is that form-givers' behavior in imposing unfair terms will
be restrained by competition.2 To some extent then, the enforceability
of clickwraps should turn on whether competition among form-givers
will create efficient performance terms.
A crucial assumption of the economic model is that products are not
differentiated, so that one producer's butter is just as acceptable to con-
sumers at a given price as another producer's butter.93 To the extent that
there are not perfect substitutes for the form-giver's product, competi-
tion will be less than perfect. The vast majority of transactions within
the scope of UCITA will involve products that are protected by patent,
copyright, trademark, trade secret or other proprietary restrictions. The
fact that the parties are transacting in such differentiated products means
it will be much less likely that people will be able to rely on competition
to make performance terms efficient.4
whether the cost of inefficient terms are large enough to make reading and understanding all
of the disclosed terms profitable. Cruz & Hinck, supra note 74, at 661.
91. For an analysis of efficiency considerations in this area, including the phenomenon
of "lemons equilibria," which discourages firms from competing on the basis of performance
terms, see Craswell, supra note 16, at 49. See also Croley & Hanson, supra note 22, at 777-
792.
92. See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass
Market Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335 (1996). For
the contrary view, see Cruz & Hinck, supra note 74, at 639.
93. See Meyerson, supra note 13, at 585-93.
94. See McGowan, supra note 64, at 1184.
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For example, it is unlikely, thanks to intellectual property laws, that
Minit-Paid's program will have the same bundle of features as its com-
petitors' products. While competing programs may be functional
equivalents, their very complexity may make it impossible or impracti-
cable for customers to quantify accurately the risks of non-performance.
The risk of customer confusion will be especially severe when licensors
promote the patented or copyrighted nature of their products.
This issue is not merely theoretical. Holly Towle correctly points
out that a major reason virtually all licensors disclaim warranties of
merchantability is that they are not comfortable with the concept of a
software program's "ordinary purposes.""5 This practice does not merely
reflect a distrust of the specificity of language or the competency of
judges and juries. To be sure, just imagine the transaction costs of
valuing warranty exposure with a complex product like a software pro-
gram consisting of a million lines of code and licensed to perform
functions that have not been performed by software before. Further, one
must take into account valuation of the same risk for competitors' prod-
ucts. In short, the differentiated and complex nature of most UCITA
products make it extremely unlikely that even the most methodical
form-taker will be able to compute performance risk accurately.96
3. Clickwraps and Price
A third characteristic of the typical UCITA clickwrap transaction
that does not bode well for competitive performance terms is the cost
structure of the typical software or information product. Designing the
software program and writing software code account for a large portion
of the expenses incurred in software manufacture and distribution. Li-
censing and distributing copies of software on disk typically represent
only a few dollars of the licensing fee. Similarly, designing and popu-
lating an information database requires substantial capital, but granting
access to additional users costs very little. This cost structure means that
a licensor's average costs per unit will fall over almost all of its prod-
uct's life. As a result, marginal cost pricing will not maximize profits.97
95. Towle, No Good Deed, supra note 37.
96. To an economist, risk is not the same as uncertainty. See Meyerson, supra note 13,
at 591 ("[R]isk is a known probability that an unfavorable outcome will occur"). Techni-
cally, neither party may be dealing with risk but only with uncertainty when it comes to
performance. In the commercial world, however, the crucial point is that the licensor will
have more information about performance issues, so that it is more likely to be able to pre-
dict what the economist would call risk.
97. See POSNER, ECONO1Ic ANALiYsis, supra note 73, at 343-49; Meyerson, supra note
13, at 607-08; but see Craswell, supra note 16, at 39-40.
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In those circumstances, there is no assurance that pricing will accu-
rately reflect marginal costs or result in an optimal allocation of
resources. This situation differs, therefore, from that assumed by those
who suggest that competition will create efficient performance terms."'
In short, those even though software and information markets may be
extremely competitive in vying for investor and customer dollars, they
are not sufficiently competitive in the economics sense such that per-
formance terms will be efficient.
In sum, an argument could be advanced that general objections to
form terms should not apply to clickwraps because technology allows
form-givers to overcome the obstacles to efficient decision-making by
form-takers. Although it is true that innovative use of linking to infor-
mation could make it easier to evaluate the content and legal effect of
clickwraps, it does not appear that those innovations would sufficiently
eliminate the information disparities about the product itself or the cog-
nitive limits that preclude efficient decisions. Therefore, disincentives to
informed assent would continue to preclude a well-founded presumed
consent doctrine, and public enforcement of form performance terms
will still not be justified.
II. UCITA's APPROACH TO FORM TERMS
There is persuasive scholarship, employing both law and economics
and conceptual approaches, holding that form terms in shrinkwraps and
clickwraps should not be enforced. UCITA takes the opposite approach.
This Part considers UCITA's stated policy objectives and its statutory
provisions to determine if it adequately responds to the objections of
scholars.
A. UCITA and Assent to Form Contracts
An extensive exegesis of UCITA's treatment of performance terms
is beyond the scope of this Article. It is also beside the point because
form contracts will simply repeat the Act's default rules where they are
in the form-taker's favor and supercede them when they are not. There-
fore, this section will merely set the context with a brief explanation of
UCITA's general approach to enforcement of form terms.
98. See Craswell, supra note 16, at 29-31. In this situation, Craswell concludes that
courts should impose a "liability" default rule (i.e. it should impose the rules the parties
would consent to if they sought an efficient outcome). Id. The statute proposed in Part III
provides such rules.
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1. The Statutory Text and the Official Comments
UCITA's approach to form contracts in commercial transactions can
be captured in one word (enforced) and in a description of four sections,
§ 102(4), § 113, § 112(a) and § 208.99 Section 102(4) defines
"agreement" as the "bargain of the parties in fact."'0 Recall that a
premise of the scholarly analysis is that form terms should not be en-
forced because there is no basis for a finding that the parties in fact had
a meeting of the minds (bargain) on form terms. A neutral reading of
§ 102(4) might suggest that, where there is no meeting of minds as a
matter of fact, there is no "agreement" that would include the form
terms. '' The Official Comment, however, makes it clear that the defini-
tion breaks no new ground, but is merely carried over from the UCC. l" 2
The real purpose of the definition is to clarify that "agreement" includes
not only a writing but also conduct, trade usage and courses of dealing
and performance-in short, Llewellyn's realism.0 3 Therefore, we should
look elsewhere to determine the enforceability of form terms.
The next relevant provision, § 113(a), sets forth the Act's basic as-
sertion of the primacy of "freedom of contract": The effect of any
provision of this [Act], including an allocation of risk or imposition of a
burden, may be varied by agreement of the parties."
The remainder of § 113(a) subjects the general rule numerous quali-
fications.' 3 To the extent that those qualifications exist, the Act adopts a
regulatory approach. In particular, § 113(a)(3) lists several performance
terms whose content is regulated, including choice of law and forum,
procedural aspects of disclaimers of implied warranties, liquidated dam-
ages, and limitations periods."° Neither § 113 nor its Official Comment
mention form contracts; thus the search for provisions applicable to
form terms continues.
99. UCITA §§ 102(4), 113, 112(a), 208. UCITA § 202, "Formation in General" might
also be cited here. However for the reasons discussed supra, the better view in the case of
partially executed transactions such as those under discussion here is to enforce the dickered
terms and limit the debate to the allocation of un-bargained risk.
100. UCITA § 102(4) (emphasis added).
101. Id.
102. UC1TA § 102 cmt. 2 (stating that" 'Agreement.' This definition derives from Uni-
form Commercial Code § 1-201(3) (1998 Official Text)").
103. Zamir, supra note 16, at 1790-91.
104. UCITA § 113(a).
105. Id.
106. UCITA § 113(a)(3). None of these sections restricts the ability of a form-giver to
use form terms to modify the relevant UCITA default rules.
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A third possibly relevant section is § 112, which determines when a
party manifests assent to a record or term.'07 Although § 112 is long and
complex, the essence is set forth in subsection (a): assent is manifest if
the party "acting with knowledge of, or after having an opportunity to
review the record or term" "authenticates" it "with intent to adopt or
accept it" or "intentionally engages in conduct or makes statements with
reason to know" that the other party may infer assent from the conduct
or statement.'O Under § 112(d), use of the product would constitute as-
sent.'9
Official Comment 2 to § 112 states that the term "manifesting as-
sent" comes from Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 19."0 The
Comment makes it clear that an "opportunity to review" the record or
term is the crucial prerequisite to assent.' Official Comment 8 ad-
dresses the "opportunity to review" requirement in more detail, but
again the intent seems to be limited to traditional contract doctrinal no-
tions."' For example, the Comment states:
Common law does not clearly establish this requirement, but the
requirement of an opportunity to review terms reasonably made
available reflects simple fairness and establishes concepts that
curtail procedural unconscionability. For a person, an opportu-
nity to review requires that a record be made available in a
manner that ought to call it to the attention of a reasonable per-
son and permit review. This requirement is met if the person
knows of the record or has reason to know that the record or
term exists in a form and location that in the circumstances
permit review of it or a copy of it.1
3
Most relevant to the form terms issue are Comments 3, b and d. 
4
Comment b starts off with the reasonable statement that "[a]ssent occurs
if a person acts or fails to act having reason to know its behavior will be
107. UCITA § 112. UCITA § 102(54) defines "record" as information inscribed on a
tangible medium or stored in another medium and "retrievable in perceivable form."
108. UCITA§ 112(a).
109. UCITA § 112(d).
110. UCITA§ ll2cmt. 2.
111. Id.
112. UCITA § 112 cmt. 8.
113. Id. (Citation omitted, emphasis added). See also UCITA § 112 cmt. 5, "Proof of
Assent," which sets forth three illustrations of assent situations. Illustration 2 deals with the
situation where an on-line stock quote service hides "terms and conditions of service; dis-
claimers" without drawing the customer's attention to those terms or requiring the customer
to "react." Id. The Comment states that in that case there is no assent to the terms. Id. Use of
the service would create a contract, and "the court would determine contract terms on other
grounds, including the rules of this Act and usage of trade." Id.
114. UCITA § 112 cmt. 3(b), (d).
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viewed by the other party as indicating assent."'' 5 This statement could
be construed as recognizing the last element of my definition of "form
terms" by requiring that a form-giver have reason to believe that enter-
ing into a transaction necessarily implies consent to the form
performance terms. But such an interpretation seems inconsistent with
the later statement in the same Comment "[t]hat is the same rule that
prevails in all other contract law."" The intentional conduct require-
ment is satisfied if the alternative of refusing to act exists, even if
refusing leaves no alternative source from which the licensee may ac-
quire the computer information.
The statements in Comment 3(d) buttress this conservative inter-
pretation of UCITA's intent:
Assent to particular terns. This Act distinguishes between as-
sent to a record and, when required by this Act or other law,
assent to a particular term in a record. Assent to a record en-
compasses all terms of the record. Section 208. Assent to a
particular term, if required, requires acts that specifically relate
to that term. This is like a requirement that a party "initial" a
clause to make it effective. One act, however, may assent to
both the record and the term if the circumstances, including the
language of the record, clearly indicate that this is true....
In short, § 112 adopts the position that assent is manifest even if the
form-giver is not reasonable in inferring assent to a particular term.' 8
This brings us to § 208, the final and most deadly provision. It pro-
vides that a party "adopts" the terms of a "standard form" as the terms
of the contract if the party manifests assent to the record as a whole."9
Subsection 3 drives the nail home, stating:
If a party adopts the terms of a record, the terms become part of
the contract without regard to the party's knowledge or under-
standing of individual terms in the record, except for a term that
is unenforceable because it fails to satisfy another requirement
of this [Act].120
Official Comment 2 is explicit about the policy underlying this rule:
115. UCITA § 112 cmt. 3(b).
116. Id.
117. UCITA § 112 cmt. 3(d).
118. Id.
119. UCITA § 208. Note the use of "contract" here (the legal obligation of the parties,
§ 102(17)), rather than "agreement," which is the bargain in fact. Note also that § 208 does
not apply to "mass market licenses," which are dealt with in § 209 and which are outside the
scope of this Article.
120. UCITA § 208(3).
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Adopting Terms. A party that assents to a record adopts the rec-
ord as the terms of the contract whether or not the record is a
standard form. There is no difference between a customized re-
cord or terms of a standard form. Standard forms are common
and provide efficiency for both parties; they are used by both li-
censees and licensors. Treating them as of lesser effect than
other records would place commercial contract law in conflict
with commercial practice."'
Thus, UCITA's Drafters not only reject a new look at form con-
tracts but also recognize that the results of that decision will be more
significant in the information age."
It appears that the scholarship discussed in Part II failed to penetrate
the drafting process, or perhaps more fairly, to persuade the drafters. 1
No reference is made to the efficiency arguments made by the scholars.
We are told only that forms are "common" and "provide efficiencies for
both parties.' 24 While that may be true for neutral terms, such as trade
usage regarding mode or timing of delivery, or for "visible" terms that
merely reflect the most commonly dickered deal, it appears that the
Drafters did not consider the application of these principles to the par-
ticular problem of performance terms.
2. UCITA Propaganda on the Enforcement Issue
It is unfortunate that the Comments only state in conclusory terms
why the Drafters chose to follow tradition. However, a Memorandum
written by the Chair of the Drafting Committee, Carlyle Ring, and the
Reporter, Raymond Nimmer, sheds additional light on the drafters' rea-
soning.'2 For example:
What if I don't read the contract, am I still bound by it? Yes.
UCITA and common law both require only that you have a
chance to read the contract, not that you actually read it. Many
of us sign and accept contracts without reading them in full.
This is not good practice, but it does not mean that this failure
by one party can change the terms that the other party is relying
126on.
121. UCITA § 207 cmt. 2.
122. UCITA § 208 cmt. 6, 7 also address the issue and expressly reject the concept of
reasonable expectations.
123. Perhaps, it was because the scholars did not propose a workable substitute.
124. UCITA § 208 cmt. 2.
125. Ring & Nimmer, supra note 80.
126. Id. (emphasis added).
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Note the assumption in the last sentence, that the form-giver is
"relying on" the enforceability of the terms. That seems to be an odd
assumption for a Committee drafting a statute for a new economy, under
a decade old. As the scholarly analysis proves, the reliance argument is
not so cut and dry. The form-giver's position could just as well be de-
scribed as a "mere hope" or in terrorem gambit. And the form-taker's
position could be portrayed as reliance on the form-giver's good faith in
standing behind its product, at least to the extent that a rational person
would accept risk in an economy that seeks an efficient, welfare maxi-
mizing result."
The Memorandum goes even further in discussing the enforceability
of shrinkwraps:
But isn't it true that shrinkwrap licenses are unenforceable un-
der current law, and UCITA will enforce them? No. Most courts
hold that shrinkwraps are enforceable or simply enforce their
terms without any contest of their enforceability. Some courts
have invalidated such contracts where the deal was clearly
closed before the shrinkwrap was presented and was not an
agreed modification. However, shrinkwrap contracting is a
standard method of doing business in both software and various
types of hard goods. Billions of dollars of commerce rely on it.
UCITA adopts, as uniform law, the position of the majority of
the cases and adds procedural and substantive protections for
the licensee that might be inferred, but are not made explicit in
the decisions.2
Here, the authors look to the few reported court decisions for
authority, rather than commercial practice. In other words, they are fine
lawyers, instructing participants to look to the courts when they can.
When the courts do not provide guidance, Ring & Nimmer switch to
citing unverified and unverifiable "commercial practice."'29
When the authors finally reach the public policy issue of enforce-
ment, they find the answer "easy," despite the intuitive leanings of
business people, judges and "spooked" academics:
Why would law want to allow such contracts [shrinkwraps]?
That's easy. This is an efficient means of doing business that
benefits both parties and is used in billions of dollars of trans-
actions. A number of leading contract law scholars have written
127. Indeed, that is the "Nordstrom" image that most companies like to adopt in their
marketing.
128. Ring & Nimmer, supra note 80.
129. Id.
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in support of similar practices in criticizing proposals in Article
2 revisions. Professor Randy Barnett, Boston University School
of Law, explained why when commenting on a proposal that
would have invalidated this distribution method:
Though the idea of consumers paying for goods before they exam-
ine all the terms of the agreement has spooked some academics, their
concerns [do not result from] any real impairment of contractual con-
sent. [I] speak here not only as a contracts professor who has written
extensively on the importance of contractual consent, but also as a fre-
quent consumer of such goods as electronics and software. It is not a
bother in the slightest to pay for a good in a store, or on-line, and then
examine the terms in the comfort of my own home provided that I can
return the good should I reject the terms. To the contrary, I cannot
imagine anything other than an aesthetic objection to this practice. True,
consumers who dislike a term in the agreement are put to some incon-
venience when they must return a good, as they would in returning any
good with which they are not completely satisfied upon inspection,
though even they benefit from the lower prices and more specifically
tailored terms that result from the practice. But this minor inconven-
ience in no way warrants a frontal attack on this form of contracting on
the grounds of lack of assent. There is certainly assent, though it hap-
pens after initial payment. There need no be law against that.
Professor Hal S. Scott, Harvard Law School, in a letter to the Arti-
cle 2 committee, described this type of contracting as an "established
retail practice of sending the full legal terms of a purchased product
with the shipped product, after payment has already been made. This
practice is of great value to both sellers and buyers. [Invalidating or
curtailing it would create] a costly and unworkable system of contract
administration. These costs will be passed on to consumers in the form
of higher product costs." '
The answer is "easy" in part because the Drafters switch the focus
to the "mass market license," which UCITA subjects to special rules
that do not also apply to the mere business-to business-license. 1 The
130. Id. (Footnotes omitted). The authors' approach to authority is particularly telling.
Footnote 1 asserts, "There is no question about the enforceability (subject to public policy
and unconscionability issues) of standard form licenses where terms are assented to up-front
in on-line or other settings." Id. (Emphasis added). However, they cite only one intermediate
state court opinion, one federal appellate decision, and two federal trial court decisions.
Given the advocacy of the memorandum, reliance on such weak authority-not a single
opinion form a state court of last resort on a state law question-is disingenuous at best.
131. Id. The mass-market license was one of the more hotly debated issues during the
UCITA drafting process. See Towle, Politics, supra note 24, at 137-145. The drafting solu-
tion is, very generally stated, that shrinkwraps are enforceable, but the licensee can return
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authors' conclusions, however, are subject to more fundamental objec-
tions. Note the following express policy justifications for form
contracting and the equally facile responses derived from the scholarly
analysis:
* Form contracts are commonly used.
* Certainly, because they are efficient for the form-giver to
propose and inefficient for the form-taker to oppose.
* The concerns do not result from "an impairment of con-
tractual consent" (apparently) because the form-taker has an
unrestricted right of return.
* The return privilege is only required in mass-market trans-
actions, which are excluded from our discussion; and the
return privilege will often have lapsed before the perform-
ance problem arises.' Their point also shifts the issue from
term consent to "contractual consent" and ignores both the
efficiency and cognitive arguments against enforcement of
form terms, and totally ignores the problem of performance
risk.
" "There is certainly assent, though it happens after initial
payment."
This ipse dixit is classic formalism that even Williston
would wink at. The proponents do not explain how the
"assent" is anything more than an empty gesture communi-
cating neither attention nor understanding. It is as though
form-giver's offer had consisted of several clearly distinct
phrases and several inaudible phrases. Would the form-
taker's "I accept" include the latter terms?
Requiring actual assent would impose a costly and unwork-
able system of contract administration.
Not necessarily, if more even-handed risk allocations were
supplied by default rules. The role of legislation should be
to seek efficient outcomes where markets fail. It is beyond
peradventure that form performance terms tend to be ineffi-
cient. By assuming that the only allocative system is one of
the product for a refund if she does not like the terms after an opportunity to review. Al-
though the concept is limited to standard form contracts, it is of little interest to the current
discussion because (a) it adopts the same general attitude toward enforceability and (b) it
was clearly a political compromise.
132. This would certainly be the case in the Minit-Paid and Geodata hypotheticals.
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contract, rather than regulation, the Drafters ignore a plau-
sible solution.
• These costs will be passed on to consumers in the form of
higher product costs.
* This statement has no empirical support, and is inconsistent
even with law-and-economics reasoning. By definition, the
terms are not negotiated, so there is no rational reason for
the form-giver to take the benefit of risk allocation into
price. Even a monopolist will not take non-cognitive (to the
buyer) risk allocations into account in determining price. 3
If, as Towle asserts, licensors cannot evaluate the cost of a
warranty of merchantability, how can they accurately value
the savings from a disclaimer so as to effect an efficient
price reduction?
So, what is one to make of UCITA's decision to grant impenetrable
enforceability to conscionable form performance terms in commercial
settings? Is the Conference just following the ghost of Llewellyn? Is
commercial law scholarship worthless unless it validates (even in con-
clusory fashion) perceptions of commercial practice? Before addressing
those issues in Section C of this Part, I will first look at the details of
UCITA's regulation of form terms to see if perhaps its Drafters reached
the right result through the wrong doors.
B. UCITA's Regulation of Performance Terms
UCITA's Reporter, Professor Nimmer, is correct in citing the im-
portance of images in developing an efficient and just commercial
law."M The question of the proper image, unfortunately, is far from re-
solved by UCITA. Karl Llewellyn's "law of the horse" gave us an
image where the buyer at the town livery stable inspected the horse and
purchased it.' 5 In contrast, by 1970, Slawson asserted that in the modem
133. See Meyerson, supra note 13, at 607-608. Because the perfect access to informa-
tion and zero transaction cost conditions for the economic model are not satisfied, it does not
follow (as it does if the assumptions hold) that a monopolist (including for sake of our analy-
sis, a patent or copyright holder) would collect all monopoly rents through pricing. The costs
of performance terms are invisible, so they do not enter into the purchaser's pricing decision,
and there is no reason for monopolists to bear risks that can be shifted through the form
terms for free. If a monopolist's invisible terms were efficient, Microsoft's Internet Explorer
form license agreement would look much different from Netscape's. It doesn't. See Cruz &
Hinck, supra note 74, for a discussion of the question whether shopping by a minority of
astute, invisible-term-savvy customers can affect this market behavior.
134. See Nimmer, supra note 6, at 3.
135. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARv. L. REv.
873, 875 (1939).
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economy customers no longer "contract," they "buy promises. ' Slaw-
son saw that pervasive merchandising, technological change and the
prevalence of complex products with significant intangible attributes
meant that customers relied much more on the seller's carefully created
product "image."'37 As a result, the price paid by the customer was for
the promised image and only that.
Thus, where caveat emptor made sense for the law of the horse,
Slawson argued that a warranty of fitness for intended purpose should
be implied in all sales involving promises, despite attempted disclaimers
in form contracts.'38 Slawson's view was not, of course, ever adopted by
the UCITA, whose predominant image was much more that of the
toaster.'39 One might ask whether the Drafters, in devising a regime for a
UCITA world, should have given more attention to the "buying prom-
ises" image. Certainly, the sophistication of electronic and information
technology and the "pig-in-a-poke" nature of many UCITA transactions
(where the full performance of a product may be received by customers
only over significant time periods), suggest that Slawson's image be
given some consideration in determining whether UCITA transactions
should be treated differently from Article 2 sales of goods. If the more
modem image of buying promises were adopted, we would expect to
see UCITA sections regulating performance terms with a view toward
ensuring that the licensor actually delivered on those promises. Even a
superficial look at the Act, however, discloses that UCITA leans sharply
toward the "goods" image for product performance, despite Nimmer's
arguments that that image is no longer appropriate.
I have defined "performance terms" to mean those contractual pro-
visions that define the promised (or more accurately, disclaimed)
performance of the product being licensed and the remedies provided
(limited) for policing that performance. Naturally, many transactors do
negotiate and define performance criteria in great detail. The terms of
the bargain can be reflected in a host of specifications, express and im-
plied warranty terms and liquidated damages and similar remedies
provisions. Such transactions are not fodder for this article. Rather, the
image here is more akin to my initial hypotheticals where the parties
have un-communicated conceptions in mind (use of the information in
the Geodata case) or incomplete conceptions (the cutting and pasting
problem in the Minit-Paid hypothetical). I will limit the discussion here
136. Slawson, supra note 16, at 546. Slawson refers specifically to consumers, but his
point has broader applicability. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Prefatory Note, supra note 3.
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to warranties and disclaimers and the following limitations on remedies:
limitations to exclusive remedies, denial of liability for incidental and
consequential damages, choice of law and choice of forum.
14
1. Warranties
The discussion on warranties need not detain us long. Although
UCITA, like Article 2, includes provisions on both express and implied
warranties, it also permits enforceable, facile and complete exclusions
of express warranties and disclaimers of implied warranties. 1 4 ' Only the
form-giver's scrivener with the dullest pen will effectively fail to avoid
all warranty obligations.
Moreover, even UCITA's implied warranties appear unsuitable to
serve as mandatory default rules. There is no pervasive warranty of
merchantability or even minimal functionality, and what does exist is
carried over from the Article 2 goods image.42
2. Choice of Law
The Act's approach to remedies is a little more regulatory, com-
porting with the Drafters' philosophy, given that remedies are not
within the exclusive expertise of the merchant class. The result, how-
ever, is no more consistent with efficiency than the approach to contract
enforceability. Unfortunately, the Official Comments are not any more
persuasive.
To begin with choice of law provisions, boilerplate choice of law
clauses are enforceable without qualification.43 Official Comment 2 to
§ 109 explains:
Contract terms that select the law applicable to the contract are
routine in commercial agreements. The information economy
accentuates their importance because it allows remote parties to
enter and perform contracts spanning multiple jurisdictions and
in circumstances that do not depend on physical location of ei-
ther party or the information. Subsection (a) enables small
companies to actively engage in multinational business; if the
140. I rest to one side the significant and difficult parol evidence issues that can arise in
these transactions. For example, UCITA's pro-consumer "mass-market license" provides
that express terms of the deal trump terms of the mass-market license. UCITA, however, also
makes it clear that an integration clause in the mass-market license can preclude introduction
of those express terms. See UCITA §§ 209(2), 301.
141. See UCITA Part 4. Part 6 of UCITA is titled "Performance." However, those pro-
visions do not define the nature of the performance obligation but merely set forth gap-
filling default rules. Thus, the form-giver is free to define performance standards.
142. See Alces, supra note 6.
143. UCITA § 109.
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agreement could not designate applicable law, even the smallest
business would be subject to the law of all fifty States and all
countries in the world. That would impose large costs and un-
certainty on an otherwise efficient system of commerce; it
would create barriers to entry. 144
The first and second sentences of the Comment are irrelevant tru-
isms. Clearly, some law is going to apply where the transaction is multi-
jurisdictional, and UCITA transactions differ from non-UCITA transac-
tions in this regard, if at all, only in that the location of the form-taker
might be unknown to the form-giver. As with any form term, there are
two choices: (1) The form-giver should be able to pick unilaterally the
jurisdiction whose law favors it; or (2) the form-giver should bear the
transactional costs of identifying the relevant legal issues, determining
the risks of enforcing the form contract under the law of various juris-
dictions in which the product will be offered and reflecting the
increased risks if any in the product's price.145 It is certainly not self-
evident that the former is a more efficient or commercially desirable
result than the latter. Yet UCITA's drafters clearly prefer the former,
even urging that it should be a uniform rule.
46
Nor is it clear that choice of law is a significant issue, even for small
businesses, in deciding whether to do business either across the country
or across the world.47 It is difficult to accept that UCITA's Drafters
really believe that small businesses use their precious capital to pay
lawyers to evaluate legal contingencies abroad. Even if firms do so, the
reduction in information costs and the exploding availability of infor-
mation on foreign law suggests that UCITA vastly overstates the costs
of determining choice of law risk.4 1 On the other hand, if UCITA is cor-
rect and the costs are high for form-givers, form-takers would incur
144. UCITA § 109 cmt. 2.
145. See id. For example, the form-giver could charge different prices in different ju-
risdictions to reflect jurisdictional risk or it could compute the potential loss from the
application of multiple states' laws and add that to the price over what would be charged if
its preferred choice were to be applied. In my experience, either of these approaches would
be largely guesswork, like so many aspects of pricing. Imagine asking a lawyer to "price" a
choice of law clause in anything but the grossest terms! See infra note 148.
146. Id.
147. The Comment's reference to the law of other nations is somewhat unusual since
UCITA will be "the law" only in the U.S., unless courts in other countries also enforce
choice of law clauses. Id.
148. Id. As a former purchaser and seller of multiple jurisdiction analyses of licensing
and other contracts, I can testify without fear of contradiction that there is a directly inverse
relation between the cost of those analyses and their utility. Even a two or three state com-
parison of a typical 10-20-paragraph agreement, not even taking into account parol evidence
and similar issues, will test the limits of cognition.
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much higher aggregate transaction costs to evaluate the same risk. If
anything about this topic is clear, it is that society will waste fewer re-
sources if licensors investigate the risk of the application of various
jurisdictions' laws to any single form contract than if their hundred or
thousands of customers have to do the same. In short, UCITA's choice
of law rule may make fine ideology, but it is neither fair nor efficient. 49
3. Forum Selection
UCITA's approach to forum selection clauses suffers from the same
impairments. By adopting the rationale of U.S. Supreme Court admi-
ralty cases enforcing such clauses, the Drafters again missed an
opportunity to consider the proper role of a legislature in dealing with
commercial efficiencies. 5 ' Two examples should suffice. First, § 110
states that forum clauses are enforceable unless unreasonable and un-
just."' The only gloss on this qualification is in Official Comment 3 to
§ 110:
The agreed term is unenforceable if it has no valid commercial
purpose and has severe and unfair impact on the other party.
This may preclude enforcement of forum agreements that
choose an unreasonable forum solely to defeat the other party's
ability to contest disputes. Terms may be unreasonable in that
they have no commercial purpose or justification and their im-
pact may be unjust if the term unfairly harms the other party.
On the other hand, an agreed choice of forum based on a valid
149. UCITA § 109 cmt. 2(a) also discusses the fact that the act discards the UCC's re-
quirement that the chosen law must have a reasonable relationship to the transaction:
In a global information economy, limitations of that type are inappropriate, especially in
cyberspace transactions where physical locations are often irrelevant or not knowable. Par-
ties may appropriately wish to select a neutral forum because neither is familiar with the law
of the other's jurisdiction. In such a case, the chosen state's law may have no relationship at
all to the transaction.
UCITA § 109 cmt. 2(a) (citing WHITE HousE REPORT, A Framework for Global Elec-
tronic Commerce (July 1, 1997)). This again assumes a negotiated or at least bargained
transaction. One could argue that retention of the UCC standard would have been satisfied in
those cases for the reasons identified in the comment. But in the form term context, the form-
giver should anticipate that the form-taker would presume that any chosen law would have a
reasonable relationship. Thus, in our software hypothetical, the Texas licensee would not
presume that a Massachusetts licensor would choose English law to apply to a contract.
150. Thomas S. Ulen, Courts, Legislatures and the General Theory of the Second Best,
73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 189 (1998) (maintaining that when we are confident that a market is
not in efficient equilibrium and that we cannot make it so with one allocative decision, courts
do not have the institutional competence to determine the second or third best solutions); G.
Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REv. 431 (1993)
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commercial purpose is not invalid simply because it adversely
affects one party, even if bargaining power was unequal....
Agreed choices of forum are important in electronic commerce.
Court decisions on jurisdiction in the Internet demonstrate the
uncertainty about when merely doing business on the Internet
exposes a party to jurisdiction in all states and all countries.
That uncertainty affects all businesses, but it has greatest impact
on small enterprises. Choice of forum agreements thus serve a
significant commercial purpose by allowing parties to control
the uncertainty and the cost that it creates.
What would the Drafters have said had they directly considered the
enforceability of forum clauses in form contracts? Here is one possible
translation if the Drafters viewed the issue consistently with the scholar-
ship highlighted above:
As a general rule, the states have adopted long-arm statutes that
subject a contracting party to the jurisdiction of the courts in the
152. UCITA § 110 cmt. 3 (citations omitted). The Comment's use of the following
quotation is no more persuasive:
The Court's discussion in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S.Ct. 1522 (1991) in
a different, but similarly multi-jurisdictional, context is relevant to determining reasonable-
ness in Internet contracting:
[It would] be entirely unreasonable to assume that a cruise passenger would or
could negotiate the terms of a forum clause in a routine commercial cruise ticket
form. Nevertheless, including a reasonable forum clause in such a form well may
be permissible for several reasons. Because it is not unlikely that a mishap in a
cruise could subject a cruise line to litigation in several different fora, the line has
a special interest in limiting such fora. Moreover, a clause establishing [the forum]
has the salutary effect of dispelling confusion as to where suits may be
brought.... Furthermore, it is likely that passengers purchasing tickets containing
a forum clause ... benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that
the cruise line enjoys....
In electronic commerce, a contractual choice of forum will often be justified on the basis
of the risk and uncertainty that would otherwise exist. Choice of a forum at a party's location
is ordinarily reasonable.
The court's reasoning is specious-it proves nothing but that the clause is in the form-
giver's favor, a fact which can be deduced from the presence of the clause in the form con-
tract. Specifically, the court does not indicate what "special interest" a form-giver has other
than making profits by shifting losses. Nor is the "salutary" effect of knowing where suit
could be brought substantial or salutary to anyone but the form-giver. While pricing effects
could make a difference, they are a factual issue courts should not decide without the basis
of a record. If the form-giver is to rely on such arguments, it should be put to the proof. But
even if there were cost savings, it would seem relevant what the source of those savings
were. No one has an interest in requiring inefficient expenditures. But what if the effect of
the forum choice is to deprive the claimant of a jury, which no passenger could have fore-
seen without legal advice? Shouldn't the court measure whether the price reduction is fair in
that circumstance?
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other party's home state. This Act would override that
legislative judgment at the option of a form-giver. The form-
giver may substitute the courts of any other jurisdiction unless
the form-taker can prove that the form-giver's choice is both
unreasonable and unjust. The form-giver's decision to shift to
the form-taker the cost of litigating in an inconvenient or less-
advantageous forum should be enforced by the courts even
though no rational form-taker would incur the costs necessary to
"price" the clause and even though no form-taker would be
reasonable in inferring that the form-giver's purchase of a
product actually evidenced any agreement to such a clause.
Agreed forum clauses are common in transactions covered by
the Act, and therefore should be enforced without consideration
of the net impact on litigation outcomes or product perform-
ance. They could have three primary effects with respect to
performance-related claims arising from form-based transac-
tions: 1. The form-taker could incur the irrational cost of
investigating and pricing the additional risk and the cost of pur-
suing its claim in the stated forum over litigating in either of the
parties' home states. This approach would be inefficient from a
societal perspective, and we hope it won't happen. 2. The form-
taker could ignore the term until a claim arose, and then factor
the additional cost into a decision whether to pursue the claim.
That calculus will result in a substantial shift of resolution
losses to form-takers when the forum choice increases costs or
reduces potential gains from pursuit of the claim to the extent
that claims are foregone rather than pursued. It therefore re-
duces the likelihood that form-givers will comply with
performance obligations. (If no claim arose, the form-taker
would reap the benefit of any price savings from such a clause.
We have, however, no generally applicable empirical evidence
of, or theoretical basis to predict, such pricing impacts). 3. To
the extent that this state has claimant-friendly substantive or
procedural law other than this Act or judges or juries who tend
to favor claimants, this Section will tend to deprive the state's
citizens of the benefit of those advantages.
This explanation might cause legislators to view § 110 differently
from the "Official Comment." By portraying forum clauses as the status
quo and products of a quid pro quo, the Comment prejudices any
meaningful discussion of the merits of the issue.
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The irony is that, as the Comment recognizes, forum clauses are
chosen to reflect the form-giver's preference for litigation results
(including transaction costs) in one jurisdiction over others. As Rakoff
asks, why should that choice be enforced just because the form-giver
thought of it?'53 For example, it is understandable that a form-giver lo-
cated in New York or Kansas and doing business with form-takers in
plaintiff-friendly states like Mississippi or Alabama would insert a fo-
rum clause. Why would a legislature in the latter states adopt § 110?
Citizens of those states, which are likely to have fewer form-givers and
more form-takers, would tend to suffer a net loss. Even where the dif-
ferences in outcomes between the chosen forum and alternative fora are
not so dramatic, at the margin the choice will result in performance de-
fects being un-remedied. The Drafters do not suggest why this is in
society's interests.
In sum, while it is one thing for the Drafters to "explain the intent"
of uniform law provisions through Official Comments, it is quite an-
other to overstate the reasons for adoption. Such failings only support
claims that the drafting process is biased in favor of form-givers.'"
4. Remedies Limitations
UCITA § 803 generally follow the UCC in enforcing a form-giver's
choice of or limitation on remedies.'55 On the surface, this is not sur-
prising given the Act's stated acceptance of freedom of contract. On
closer inspection, however, UCITA denotes perhaps the Drafters' great-
est missed opportunity. Perhaps no area of contract law doctrine is more
clearly dependent on public policy considerations than remedies. Offi-
cial Comment 2 to Section 803 states that:
Parties may by agreement fit their remedies to their particular
deal. This is fundamental to contract practice and defines the
cost of a transaction. A party that agrees to accept all liability
for breach will charge more than a party that contractually
153. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1181.
154. The UCITA Drafters' political efforts in this regard are particularly transparent
when their Comments adopt the mantle of "friend of small business." One would hope that
policy debate ended with the chain store legislation of the 1930s. If a producer's products
cause more legally cognizable losses than revenue produced, what public interest is there in
keeping the producer afloat? After our experience with television, is there any reason to
encourage companies to bring bad ideas to market? Nonetheless, the Comment implies as
much in suggesting that litigation in the plaintiff's preferred forum is somehow an unfair
advantage to the plaintiff.
155. UCITA § 803; cf. UCC § 2-719. There are some differences, the most important
being the UCITA rule that a failure of a limited remedy to fulfill its essential purpose also
knocks out limitations of consequential damages.
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limits liability. Similarly, a party may not be willing to acquire
a product unless it obtains particular remedies and recourse.
How parties order these choices depends on the agreement, but
no principle of commercial contract law suggests that parties'
ability to control these issues should be precluded.
15 6
The Drafters ability to write hyperbole in the emphasized language
defies present explication. Suffice it to say, this statement clearly cannot
withstand attack if the scholarly analysis is accepted as even marginally
credible.
To price a remedies limitation efficiently requires detailed informa-
tion about the frequency and severity of performance breakdowns, the
transactional costs associated with repairing or replacing the product,
and so on. Regardless of those concerns, the Comment points to a direct
and universal connection between performance terms and pricing (a
party will "charge more" for a product with judicial remedies for per-
formance problems, and a product with limited remedies will cost
less).'57 This is pure ideology. Even if it is assumed that remedies are
factored into pricing, the minimum question is whether the price impact
is efficient. There is no reason to presume that it will be efficient since
the factoring is done solely by the form-giver 55
Form-takers, especially with respect to complex technology prod-
ucts, are unlikely to have the requisite technical information. The costs
of obtaining such performance information, even if not proprietary, are
substantial. Therefore, even negotiated contracts are likely to be ineffi-
cient in that regard.'59 In these circumstances, a primary public policy
justification for judicial enforcement of private agreements dissipates.O60
If we don't have any confidence that a "contract" will result in a so-
156. UCITA § 803 cmt. 2 (emphasis added). Perhaps the most obvious counter to this
assertion is the law's general abhorrence of liquidated damages clauses. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981).
157. Id.
158. The more fundamental question is whether the limitation is just. For example, is a
money-back guarantee as an exclusive remedy always just? It may be difficult to identify the
public interest that would permit a marketing dynamo to persuade small, technologically
unsophisticated firms to run software as a fundamental part of their operations and then limit
their remedy to a return of the purchase price when the software does not function.
159. RONALD H. COASE, THE FIM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 174 (1988). Hence,
Coase stressed his fundamental assumption that transaction costs must be minimal for bar-
gaining to achieve efficiency. In fact, he was convinced that a world with zero transactional
costs was not "Coasean," but "the world of modern economic theory, one which I was hop-
ing to persuade economists to leave." As a result, Coase concluded that modem economists'
policy proposals were "the stuff dreams are made of." Id.
160. See supra Introduction Part D.3.
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cially desirable outcome, why should the public's resources be used to
enforce the contract?
Alternatively, even in a forms-based UCITA transaction, it might be
rational for a legislature to conclude that form-giver-chosen remedies
will be efficient on a second or third best basis, perhaps with a limiting
principle on freedom of contract. 161 The UCITAIUCC "failure of its es-
sential purpose" concept could be seen as such a limiting principle, but
the Official Comment's explanation strongly implies that the purpose of
the remedy must be determined on a "four comers" basis.' 62 Since the
form-giver's intent is the only reference point in a remedy analysis, it
can be expected that the essential purpose test will not serve a limiting
function.
63
Another limiting principle might be a requirement that the form
provide at least a fair quantum of remedy.' The Official Comment
states, however, that courts should not recognize such a principle to in-
validate remedy limitations clauses under § 803's essential purpose test.
Instead, the Drafters state:
However, the essence of any contract is that parties accept the
legal consequences of their deal and that there be at least a fair
quantum of remedy in the event of breach. Contracts that do not
do so may fail for lack of consideration or mutuality. This does
not mean that a court can rewrite the agreement or the agreed
remedies. If a remedy is provided and is made exclusive, the
fact that it does not fully compensate the aggrieved party is not
a reason to allow that party to avoid the consequences of its
agreement. Remedy terms are agreed allocations of risks. For
example, a contract that limits recovery for software defects
used in a satellite system to the price of the software (e.g.,
$100,000) is not unenforceable because the defect caused loss
of a $1 million satellite. A decision to set a limit affects pricing
and risk and cannot be set aside because the loss eventually fell
on one party. On the other hand, a contract that states "licensee
will have no responsibility for any harm to licensor caused by
161. Ulen, supra note 150.
162. UCITA § 803 cmt. 5.
163. For example, in the software hypothetical, HOE might argue that the exclusive
remedy of replacing the CD fails its essential purpose because replacement would not cure
the compilation problem. However, Comment 5(a) to § 803 states that the court should look
only to the performance obligation to judge the purpose of the remedy. See UCITA § 803
cmt. 5(a). Here the form provides no performance obligation, so it is difficult to see how any
remedy could fail its purpose of enforcing a non-obligation.
164. Cf. UCC § 2-204 cmt.
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licensee's intentional breach of any aspect of the agreement"
may lack mutuality to establish a contract."'
We see once again the Drafters' unfounded and dogmatic reliance
on the invisible hand of pricing. The Drafters do not even blush at the
fact that a remedies limitation may effectively operate as an utter denial
of contractual undertaking. As the last sentence of the quoted Comment
says, even proof of a declination of any responsibility for an intentional
breach only gets a "may" on the enforceability scale. Form-givers who
do not stand behind their products and instead hide behind boilerplate
limitations can take great comfort in a Drafting Committee so blind to
the problems of form contracts and the intractability of performance
obligations. What happened to commercial reasonableness?
5. UCITA's "Fundamental Public Policy" Exception to Enforcement
No discussion of UCITA's treatment of performance terms in com-
mercial form contracts would be complete without mention § 105's
general "out" for contract terms that violate a "fundamental public pol-
icy., I
The primary focus of this provision is the Drafters' recognition of
the significance of First Amendment and intellectual property issues in
UCITA transactions. 67 However, the text is not so limited, and the
Drafters have addressed the application of § 105(b) to contract terms in
Official Comment 3. While most of the focus falls on restricting infor-
mation use,' the Comment makes clear that the Drafters intended that
no public policy override will apply in the context of performance
terms:
With reference to contract law policies that regulate the bargain
of the parties, this Act makes express public policy choices.
Contract law issues such as contract formation, creation and
disclaimer of warranties, measuring and limiting damages, basic
contractual obligations, contractual background rules, the effect
of contractual choice, risk of loss, and the like, including the
right of parties to alter the effect of the terms of this Act by their
agreement should not be invalidated under subsection (b) of this
section. This subsection deals with policies that implicate the
broader public interest and the balance between enforcing
165. UCITA § 803 cmt. 6 (emphasis added).
166. UCITA § 105(b).
167. UCITA § 105 cmt. 3.
168. Id.
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private transactions and the need to protect the public domain of
information. 69
The Comments explicitly disclose once again the Drafters' disre-
gard of the form transaction. The Drafters therefore, miss another
opportunity to bring the Act to bear on that type of transaction most re-
quiring legislative oversight.7
C. Where UCITA Went Wrong
No law-much less a uniform law on a new and still developing
area of commerce---can hope to avoid criticism for its drafters' choices.
Other commentators have suggested that UCITA's scope is perhaps too
aggressive. 7' In trying to prescribe a legal regime for the most rapidly
developing economy in history, the drafters took on a daunting task.
Certainly they are to be congratulated on making the drafting process as
public as practicable.' There is little to be gained at this point by quib-
bling about particular language choices or by nibbling at the edges of
fundamental debates.
Nor is it the intent of the foregoing discussion to urge particular
drafting changes. Instead, my purpose is to demonstrate the extent to
which the Drafters' freedom of contract ideology interfered with a
sound anglysis that could have indicated more appropriate ways to
achieve efficient results in transactions that are consensual in form but
not contractual in essence. An understanding of the weakness(es) of
169. Id.
170. This is not to say, however, that the Drafters erred in not addressing performance
risk in form contracts under a "public policy" rubric. It is sufficient that § Ill of UCITA
adopts UCC Article 2's unconscionability doctrine. In effect, unconscionability is merely a
subset of the public policy control principle, a subset that focuses on both bargaining defi-
ciencies and unfair results. As is the case with unconscionability, the public policy hammer
is too blunt and unwieldy to provide either precision to courts in resolving cases or guidance
to parties in resolving performance problems. In other words, resort to unconscionability
would be preferable to § 105(b) if the legislature decided that a general judicial veto of ne-
gotiated terms was appropriate.
However, both courts and commentators have demonstrated that unconscionability is not
an effective tool in dealing with performance risks under form contracts. See, e.g., Eisen-
berg, Bargain, supra note 16, at 800. In focusing unconscionability doctrine on "procedural"
aspects such as disclosure and sales tactics and relative bargaining power, courts have made
the concept unsuitable for forms-based transactions in which both parties are acting perfectly
rationally yet inefficiently. While the doctrine may have been successful in encouraging
courts to limit to a single rationale their covert efforts to do justice, neither the rhetoric nor
the history of unconscionability makes it a viable candidate for addressing the subject at
hand.
171. See Alces, supra note 6, 292-98; Braucher, supra note 9; O'Rourke, supra note
81.
172. Shah, supra note 9, at 86-88.
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UCITA's approach might help us identify how a legislature should deal
with performance risk in form contracts. For that purpose, I believe that
there are five primary reasons UCITA fails to address this issue in the
proper fashion.
1. The Drafters Were too Certain About Certainty
Perhaps the problem lay in the Drafters' rush to provide "certainty"
of contract enforceability in the belief that reduction of contracting risk
was necessary for market development. The explosive growth of the
information economy during the drafting and legislative process has
demonstrated that the need for certainty was highly overrated, and it is
highly unlikely that contractual certainty was ever very high on the wish
lists of CEOs (as opposed to General Counsel). After all, in markets
where the value of information and technology has a half-life of months
or days, and where the disputes rage over the very existence of property
rights in the subjects of commerce, judicial enforcement of contracts is
of subsidiary interest. Moreover, enforceability of the full range of con-
tract law issues, as attempted by UCITA, was unnecessary to the
attainment of the core interests of UCITA proponents. Whether form
shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements are enforceable with respect to all
terms was not an issue that really needed to be addressed. Nor should it
have been addressed, unless it would have received careful analysis. As
the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the issues of form contracts and
performance problems are complex and cannot be resolved with a mere
nod of the head to "duty to read." The Drafters should not have taken on
the chore unless they were going to do it justice.
2. UCITA is too Doctrinal and not Commercial Enough
Despite their just admiration for Article 2 and Lex Llewellyn, it ap-
pears that the Drafters may have ended up paying mostly lip service to
Llewellyn's conviction that commercial legislation must start with
commerce and not judicial doctrine. Obviously speculation, but where
the Drafters may have gotten off the wagon is in their failing to appreci-
ate the significance a crucial difference between their drafting
assignment and Llewellyn's. The law of the sales of goods had been
long and hotly litigated for decades. The task of Article 2's drafters was
more to achieve uniformity through codification-selecting the rules
from precedents more consistent with then current commercial prac-
tices-than it was to create a law that would become uniformY1 3 The
173. See Karl Llewellyn, Why A Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REv. 779 (1953); see
also Grant Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 814-815 (1962); In-
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focus on judicial resolution of litigated disputes was therefore under-
standable. In a sense, the task and process was not that much different
from that facing the American Law Institute in promulgating a Restate-
ment of Contracts.
In contrast, UCITA deals with transactions of very recent vintage
and with types of products that were not even in existence when the
drafting process started.74 The dearth of case decisions demonstrates
that the problem is one of Statement, not Restatement. The Drafters
could have started with paradigm and process, ignoring judicial contract
doctrine.'75 They could have drafted a law that built on the structure of
current commercial transactions, a statute that prescribed how to make
those transactions (more) efficient and fair. Instead, they appear to have
interpreted too literally Gilmore's admonition "Be accurate rather than
logical" to mean that they should be neither bold nor proactive when it
came to performance risk. As a result, UCITA's structure at least in re-
gard to performance risk appears to be derived more from judicial
constructs than from commercial realities.
To phrase the point somewhat differently, the Drafters became too
conservative in replicating the Article 2 approach across all issues. By
adopting the "duty to read" myth that predated even the formalists, the
Drafters missed an opportunity to solve the conundrum of a rational
contracting process (form contracts unread and resultingly unappreci-
ated by form-takers) that produces irrational economic results (risks
borne by those who cannot efficiently bear them). They properly recog-
nized that the old Article 2 paradigm did not work for some issues, but
they did not identify all the paradigms that needed to be addressed. Ne-
gotiated transactions and undocumented transactions, while important,
do not present the same issues as form transactions; defining the appro-
priate scope for licenses and reconciling tensions between federal
intellectual property law and state contract law do not present the same
issues as allocating performance risk.
grid M. Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn's Attempt to Achieve The
Good, The True, The Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEo. L.J. 1141 (1985).
174. For example, products using Internet technology to share software applications, to
store computer files on remote servers, or to access music files from third parties were not
common when UCITA was first proposed.
175. In this regard, it appears that Professor Nimmer's creative use of "images" and his
recognition of the significance of paradigm did not convince the Drafting Committee to
shuffle off the UCC's judicial coils. See Nimmer, supra note 6. The tendency to rely on
judicial precedent is particularly evident in the Official Comments to §§ 109, 110 and 208.
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3. The Information Age Changed the
Paradigm Form Transaction
To over-generalize: in the Article 2 era commercial practices were
such that the paradigm transactions were un- or under-documented.
Agreements were made through phone calls and telegrams or through
the now infamous battles of forms. Gap fillers were important in that
context to deal with subjects the parties did not address or as to which
their forms conflicted. Shrinkwraps and clickwraps differ in that there is
seldom a gap in the comprehensiveness of the terms provided to the
form-taker, no real issue of disclosure in terms of time or format, and no
responsive form used by the form-taker. 76 UCITA form transactions
tend to be truly unilateral contracts accepted by payment or use. The
real issue is not whether to provide gap-fillers in terms when neither
party addressed an issue, but whether to enforce terms that were appar-
ently undisputed ex ante.
The central form/performance risk problem has never been one of
"manifest assent" based on "opportunity to review," but of the form-
taker's inability to price the performance terms. That distinction be-
comes increasingly significant as we move from the Article 2 image of
mass-produced fungible goods and established distribution in a mature
"production" economy 77 to the UCITA image of highly differentiated,
intangible products and services (in which the contract may be the only
method of defining the product) with revolutionary distribution channels
and an information economy.1
Nonetheless, the Drafters still portray the issue as one of disclosure
and assent. By looking at an economically irrelevant issue, rather than
the increasingly significant one of risk allocation, the Drafters failed to
mind their own counsel of keeping attuned to the significance of
change.
4. UCITA Overvalues the Pro-Form-Giver Normative Argument
One cannot read the Official Comments quoted above without
sensing the Drafters' acceptance of the merits of a caveat emptor ap-
proach to assent, not just to the transaction but to each purported term of
176. Larger firms that are regular buyers/licensees in UC1TA transactions may have
their own forms and even small companies may have access to such forms through counsel
or the Internet. But the licensee's form terms on performance risk are no more likely to lead
to an efficient result than the licensor's because both are wild shots in the Pareto/Kaldor-
Hicks dark. For simplicity the remaining discussion will assume that the only form-giver is
the licensor. The statute proposed in Part III is neutral on this issue.
177. This is the image, not necessarily the universal truth.
178. That is, one can define ("identify" in UCC Art. 2 parlance) a toaster by pointing to
it. But that option is not available for specifying rights to access an information database.
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the transaction. It can be inferred that the Drafters accept the conven-
tional wisdom that (1) forms should bind form-takers just because they
can read them; and (2) enforcing forms is efficient and causes the econ-
omy to grow in desirable ways. I have already cited scholarship
contesting the validity of that wisdom from the perspective of effi-
ciency. In fairness to the Drafters though, the issue in their eyes might
not be efficiency alone: their concern could also be one of personal re-
sponsibility and fairness. Commercial customers know the risk of
dealing with form contracts. They know the forms favor (even unrea-
sonably) the form-giver. No one forced parties to transact, and therefore
they shouldn't get a second bite-and if they do, the costs will be
shifted back to "innocent" customers, shareholders and employees.'79
The weakness in such a statement of the issue is that it rests on the
notion that the form-giver is in fact relying on the enforceability of the
terms in setting price. That reliance cannot be established simply by the
presence of a term in the form, because any capable drafter would in-
clude one-sided terms even if they were unlikely to be enforced.
Inclusion of such terms has long been standard practice, either as bar-
gaining chips with sophisticated form-takers or in terrorem with
unsophisticated parties. How else can one explain the presence in stan-
dard forms of terms that are clearly unenforceable under controlling
law?80
Even if we assume that the form-giver has relied on the form-taker's
participation in the transaction as demonstrating assent, it is difficult to
portray that reliance as reasonable, and therefore, justified in the sight
of a legislature. For, as discussed above, the form-giver must be charged
with knowledge that the risks allocated by the term cannot be rationally
priced by the form-taker. Therefore, the only one who can determine if
the risk was shifted for value (taken into account in price) is the form-
giver. Can we say that a form-giver is justifiably relying on an assump-
tion of assent just because it sees customers accepting, without
negotiation or question, a deal too good to the form-giver to be true? I
think not. There is a difference between justified reliance and wishful
thinking.
179. See Towle, Politics, supra note 24; see also, White, supra note 29, at 319-24.
180. Common examples are forfeiture and liquidated damages clauses and default
clauses that permit termination and/or acceleration on non-material breaches. It is interesting
that some of the same commentators who make the duty to read/licensor's reliance argument
also urge that care should be used in interpreting as "owner's manuals" and other product
disclosures rather than as express warranties because buyers just do not rely on such state-
ments. See, Towle, No Good Deed, supra note 37. The statute proposed in Part M recognizes
the general legitimacy of Towle's point, but makes the content of those disclosures a factor
to be taken into account in determining the performance standard.
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The most fundamental reason for rejecting the caveat emptor ap-
proach is that it can apply only where the background law creates the
possibility of reliance. Assume that form-givers have priced their prod-
ucts on the basis of form risk allocations condoned by current law. As a
result, under the common agreement exemplified in the Minit-Paid hy-
pothetical, the form-giver has assumed no performance risk, and the
price should include no amount to compensate Minit-Paid for any risk.
After all, a form-giver could reasonably conclude that under UCITA it
would be liable only for replacement of a CD and that if the form-taker
wanted a greater remedy, it would have to arbitrate in the form-giver's
chosen state before the general counsel of the Society for the Advance-
ment of Licensors.
The wonder of legislation, however, is that it changes the law, and
therefore the result, prospectively. If UCITA had adopted a mandatory
scheme for resolving performance problems in form transactions, the
reliance argument would have disappeared. Once form-givers knew that
forms would not be enforced, they would change their pricing and/or
other terms."' Since the legislation would apply to all market partici-
pants, fairness, certainty and efficiency would be assured.'82 UCITA's
failure, then, is in judging form-takers too harshly for failing to comply
with a normative obligation that UCITA could change without harm to
the market or the parties. Whether such a mandatory scheme could be
devised is the subject of Part IV.
5. Certainty and Remedies Don't Mix
UCITA rightfully prizes certainty as a transactional value. The goal
of certainty, however, can only be accorded to certain aspects of per-
formance. UCITA can achieve certainty by holding that a non-
performing party always wins if it has incorporated the right exculpa-
tory terms into its form. I have parted ways with UCITA on that score.
But once the need for remedy arises, UCITA and I walk the same path.
Valuation of contract rights is amazingly speculative because so many
different types of transactions fall within UCITA's scope and because
those transactions involve new and developing technologies, marketing
concepts and markets. To suggest, as UCITA does in § 809, that dam-
ages can be measured through applications of statutory formula is
181. This is a corollary to the Coase Theorem. Because there are substantial transaction
costs, original entitlements (the statutory risk allocation) will affect ultimate outcomes.
182. For a discussion of the relevance of the effects of legislation on reliance interests,
see Leo L. Clarke, The Contract Clause: A Basis for Limited Judicial Review of State Eco-
nomic Regulation, 39 U. MIAru L. REv. 183 (1985).
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exceedingly optimistic."' The sheer number of indeterminate concepts
employed in the formulas makes it wholly impractical to price the op-
tion (or effect) of breach in advance. The Drafters wisely anticipated
this in providing in § 809(a)(1)(C), a catchall that damages may be cal-
culated "in any reasonable manner."'
In short, UCITA could achieve certainty for all aspects of a transac-
tion only if form terms deprive non-defaulting parties of remedies. If
remedies are available, neither transactor can determine, prior to the
transaction, the actual cost of non-performance with any more certainty
than currently exists (a "reasonable" amount of damages based on "my"
view of value based on a complex scenario of possible defaults). This is
not to criticize UCITA's remedial provisions. Rather, the point rein-
forces my earlier conclusion that UCITA's goal of certainty of
obligation through the enforcement of form terms will not achieve effi-
ciency when the valuation of remedies is so uncertain.
III. ALLOCATING PERFORMANCE RISK
THROUGH LEGISLATION
If I have made any point by now, it is that freedom of contract is not
the answer to the performance risk problem in UCITA transactions.
Now comes the hard part: If not freedom of contract, then what? After
all, the appeal of "freedom of contract" as a basis for drafting a com-
mercial law statute is that it allows the drafter to avoid the hard
questions. The drafters could say that "the parties will know more about
that than we do and they're in the best position to deal with the specif-
ics."' 5 The trouble with form transactions, however, is that the parties,
at least one of them anyway, do not know the true facts and will not
seek them out.
Earlier I chided UCITA for paying insufficient attention to
preeminent scholarship. In fairness perhaps, the reason that scholarship
was not accorded more consideration is that the scholars failed to
propose alternative solutions that were consistent with the overall
UCC/UCITA approach. For example, Slawson, who looks at the
problem using an administrative law analog, argues in general terms
that adhesion contracts should be enforced only to the extent that the
terms are in the public interest. 86 Rakoff more specifically argues that
183. UCITA § 809(a)(1).
184. UCITA § 809(a)(1)(C).
185. Posner recognizes this "out" for presumed intention devotees. See, POSNER, supra
note 73.
186. See Slawson, supra note 16, at 556.
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courts should resort to gap fillers unless the form-giver can demonstrate
that the form term is commercially reasonable. I" Eisenberg is less
expansive regarding the implications of his analysis. It appears that he is
primarily concerned with the form-giver's right to enforce the defective
"bargain" and would limit recovery to restitution. With respect to the
rights of the form-taker, he is less explicit and would perhaps resort to
default rules.188
It is not surprising that the proposals of these critics are so gen-
eral-they did not limit their scope to a specific type of transaction,
particular contractual term or transaction risk. As the complexity of
UCITA (necessary as it may be) demonstrates, it is simply not feasible
to address a full range of potential positive law rules in a single article.
Thus, I am not surprised that it appears that no one has yet developed a
coherent, complete and commercially practical solution to the allocation
of performance risk. This section of the article lays out one possible
solution to the performance risk problem.
A. Parameters for Performance Legislation
Part IV.B sets forth a statutory proposal, complete with Official
Comment. Certainly, it would be unfair to criticize UCITA's Drafters
for failing to do what I cannot do myself. Before proceeding to attack
the problem, however, it will be worthwhile to identify some parameters
of a successful solution. There are at least seven:
1. Transactional Reality v. Contract and Tort Concepts
The transactions at issue are voluntary but not contractual. Since the
premise of my analysis is the absence of efficient assent, any solution
should not import contract doctrine without careful consideration of its
applicability to the commercial context. Thus, there is no reason to be-
gin (or end) an analysis of who should bear the risk of consequential
damages with the centuries old rule of Hadley v. Baxendale or with the
variations on its theme wrought by hundreds of subsequent decisions.
Similarly, it is not helpful to incorporate concepts or terms from tort
law. Even though courts may divide the commercial world into prop-
erty, tort and contracts fiefdoms, there is no tenet of logic or policies
that require legislatures to do the same. As with precepts of contract law
and terminology, words and rubrics familiar in tort law may provide
comfort and efficiency of transmission, but only at an undue cost in
187. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1176.
188. See Eisenberg, Bargain, supra note 16, at 741-43; Eisenberg, Cognition, supra
note 1, at 212-13.
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qualification and confusion. For example, the "economic loss doctrine"
holds that a claimant should be limited to a contract claim (in lieu of a
tort cause of action) unless the defendant's wrong has caused bodily
injury or property damage to property other than the subject of the
transaction. V9 That doctrine, however, is rooted in attempts to separate
tort law from contract law for reasons that make little doctrinal and only
chimerical practical senseY°
In short, the analysis should look through contract and tort labels to
the nature of the transaction and the parties' respective positions. A
legislative solution should recognize that the distribution of perform-
ance risk should be imposed not on the basis of consent but on the
following societal judgments:
1. Performance risk should not fall randomly on licensees.
2. Producers are in the best position to avoid or spread the risk
that their products will not perform as expected.
3. Licensees cannot efficiently evaluate performance risk ex-
cept (possibly) through price.
4. Producers should therefore to the extent possible price their
products to reflect and spread that risk. 9"'
5. To the extent that markets are not sufficiently competitive
to cause price to reflect performance risk, the law should
impose performance loss on the party that can best manage
that risk through avoidance or spreading.
6. Because 1 through 5 lead to outcomes that are preferable to
those unilaterally dictated by forms, product markets will
tend to be more efficient.
Thus, the guiding principle should not be what the parties would
have done if they had thought about it, or what most parties would do if
left free to bargain. Neither of those principles is helpful because they
require a fiction that the parties could or ever would so think or bargain.
Because we do not live in a world of fairly perfect information or mini-
mal transaction costs, the legislative solution should be the one that
would be chosen if the transaction were telescoped into a single party
decision. 9'
189. See, Peter A. Alces & Aaron S. Book, When Y2K Causes 'Economic Loss' to
'Other Propery,' 84 MINN. L. REv. 1, 38-50 (1999).
190. See id.
191. "To the extent possible" is intended to refer to the consequential damages risk,
which the producer lacks the information to evaluate completely.
192. This is a Coasean solution. See Farber, supra note 13, at 418-419.
2000-20011
60 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
If the two commercial transactors (licensor and licensee) were one
(i.e. both the producer and user, so that the producer were developing a
product for its own internal use), how would it manage the risk of per-
formance? It would invest in product design and testing until the
marginal return from that investment exceeded the marginal out-of-
pocket and consequential damages from performance failures. We
might expect in such a case that the licensor would design terms to
avoid problems that occurred often enough or were serious enough that
the anticipated (or experienced) aggregate cost of failures during per-
formance were greater than the marginal design costs. A statutory
solution should seek the same objective.
2. Regulation v. Paternalism
The appropriate level of governmental involvement in commercial
transactions has been an enduring debate among scholars and law re-
formers. UCITA's approach is to allow the parties to make their own
rules except in rare situations where UCITA regulates certain terms of
the transaction.'93 UCITA also recognizes that states have a certain pa-
ternalistic interest with respect to consumers, but it defers to other
statutes to assert those interests.'94
While I have rejected the application of the UCITA approach to
forms/performance problems, I do not disagree with the Drafters' re-
luctance to set detailed rules in concrete for commercial transactors.
Even form-takers should be able to assume stupid performance risks.
On the other hand, as the scholarly analysis demonstrates, both contract
doctrine and the public interest in an efficient and fair economy require
knowing assent to the imposition of contingent performance terms. The
rub, then, is to recognize legitimate autonomy without allowing the eco-
nomic forces that cause form transactions to overwhelm that autonomy.
Form-givers should be able to avoid the mandatory rules only if the
form-taker's waiver is both knowing and priced in some fashion.
One approach would be for the rules to be mandatory unless the
parties' agreement provided otherwise. To avoid the problem of the
"otherwise" being an invisible term in a form, the statute would have to
require, at a minimum, that the form-taker separately manifest assent to
the waiver of the statutory benefit. Experience with statutory waivers in
other commercial forms, such as loan guaranties, demonstrates that even
conspicuous language and separate initialing seldom produce knowing
193. SeeUCITA§ 113.
194. See UCITA § 105(c).
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assent. This obstacle is even more apparent in the shrinkwrap/clickwrap
context, where not even the formality of a signature is required.
Thus, if the mandatory rules are to be generally applicable except in
the case of the priced waiver, the burden should be on the form-giver to
demonstrate that the waiver was made in a transaction where the public
policy for the statute did not apply. To make that showing, the form-
giver should be required to show that the transaction was not a form
transaction, but commercially negotiated to the extent that the form-
giver could reasonably rely on the purported assent to the waiver. The
form-giver should be free to make the showing as it sees fit. In addition,
to provide some degree of certainty, the statute should include a safe
harbor pursuant to which the form-giver would know that the mandatory
provisions did not apply. The model statute proposes two such safe har-
bor provisions: (1) separate pricing for the two options, one on form
terms and one on default rule terms; 9' and (2) provision of a disclosure
package on performance risks designed to level the playing field.
UCITA fans may argue that this approach is pure paternalism in the
commercial context since merchants should have the obligation to know
the commercial law, to understand their rights under the mandatory
rules and, foolishly, to waive them if they wish. That argument, how-
ever, is just a re-cast of the duty to read. The purpose of the statute is
simply to deal with the disparity in transactional costs and the informa-
tion gaps that make form transactions particularly inefficient with
respect to performance terms. The proposal may not be a first best solu-
tion, but it is designed to provide at least a modicum of fairness in
performance terms.
3. Performance Obligation v. Performance Remedy
THE DOCTRINAL ISSUE. Contractarians often distinguish between the
obligation of a contract and the remedy for breach of that obligation.
96
In commercial law, the formula is generally implied warranty, breach,
causation and remedy. Judges and commentators, however, criticize
warranty as a useless label; "implied warranty" generally leads to the
195. This is consistent with the notion that price is the most efficient signal of transac-
tion value. Once a form-taker evaluates the statutory bundle of rights (i.e. the default terms),
it can roughly price the value of those rights in the typical transaction. As long as the spread
between the two safe harbor quotes is greater than the value the form-taker places on the
rights, it can make a quick and at least reasonably informed decision. Note that this provision
assumes that the legislative default terms are efficient and just, even though I do not agree
with UCITA's choices. See supra Introduction Part B.
196. Eisenberg, Bargain, supra note 16, at 800 (asserting that the bargain principle re-
quires resolution of two issues, was a bargain made and what is the appropriate remedy).
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conclusion that liability should follow. 9 7 A statutory solution should
therefore avoid such common law baggage where possible.
Nevertheless, even though doctrinal distinctions can impede proper
analysis, a forceful argument can be made that a fair and efficient per-
formance law must take into account the difference between what a
product is supposed to do (the performance standard) and what should
happen when it does not do it (the performance remedy). This would
seem to be a non-controversial point, except that able commentators
have argued that the most basic form of performance obligation, the
implied warranty of merchantability, is so vague as to be meaningless.'
Indeed, the fuzziness of the classic standard of "fit for the ordinary pur-
poses" is cited as a primary reason form-givers invariably disclaim the
warranty.'" In other words, the argument is that the disclaimer is not
just the form-giver's ipse dixit, but a commercially reasonable element
of risk management in an arm's length deal.
If it were really the case, as it may well be, that a performance stan-
dard or obligation cannot be specified ex ante, then perhaps it makes no
sense to distinguish performance obligation from performance remedy.
The legislative drafter would then be left with three primary options:
(1) Stick with the tried and true but-based on its universal dis-
claimer, failed-merchantability standard;
(2) Adopt an absolute quality standard that makes the producer
virtually strictly liable for performance problems; or
(3) Skip the separate obligation analysis and focus on the rem-
edy question: "which party should bear the loss?"
197. Nimmer, supra note 6, at 43 n. 165.
198. See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Implied Warranty of Merchantability in
Softivare Contracts: A Warranty No One Dares to Give and How To Change That, 16 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFo. L. 393 (1998); Towle, No Good Deed, supra note 37. It
should be noted that Gomulkiewicz wrote as an in-house counsel for Microsoft and Towle
represents a software association. This does not make them unqualified to speak on the is-
sues-just the opposite in fact. One might consider, however, whether their professional
responsibilities to advocate their clients' interests color their positions. Of course, the same
can be said about an academic's ideology and/or pride of authorship in his or her ideas. See,
Towle, Politics, supra note 24, at 154-161.
199. Towle, No Good Deed, supra note 37 (citing the fact that the disclaimer is in-
cluded even in non-form transactions between sophisticated commercial entities, sometimes
with warranties substituting for unacceptably ambiguous implied warranty rights).
200. See id.; Croley & Hanson, supra note 22, at 719 (commenting that "[ilt seems dif-
ficult to imagine that Firestone is exploiting General Motors [when Firestone disclaims
implied warranties]"). But large volume component buyers and sophisticated commercial
consumers can have the ability to manage risk more cheaply than the producer. These claims
would be more credible if form-givers generally substituted more substantive express war-
ranties. Typically, however, the only express warranty, besides minimal system
specifications, is one of quality workmanship and materials.
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The choice depends on what is most consistent with commercial re-
ality and therefore with the premise of Lex Llewellyn and UCITA.
DEFINING A MEANINGFUL OBLIGATION. As one who has struggled
with drafting warranty clauses, either to placate customer demands or in
response to vendor reticence, I am doubtful that there is much to be
gained from attempting to improve legislatively on the UCC/UCITA
formula if one accepts their drafters' premise that the performance obli-
gation can be captured in a sentence or two compiled from judicial
decisions. 2 ' The differences in products and transactions are simply too
great to develop a meaningful ex ante standard.2 2
The second option, absolute enterprise liability, presents conceptual
and political difficulties. As to the former, Croley and Hanson conclude
that the consumer products liability debate, which essentially presents a
contest between contract and tort law perspectives, would be resolved
best through an absolute enterprise liability rule.2 3 Although their rea-
soning is largely consistent with my approach here, I am not convinced
that what makes sense for the Article 2 economy will also make sense
for the UCITA economy. First, the potential for end-user error in
UCITA transactions seems intuitively higher than in the goods econ-
omy, given the relative complexity and rate of change of the technology
involved. Second, UCITA products tend to be used as components in
large systems (for example, software in networks) to a greater extent
than in the old automobile or toaster world, thereby creating a higher
probability of causation and remedies issues. Both of these factors sug-
gest that the legislative solution should incorporate a more explicit risk
management approach than Croley and Hanson seem to anticipate. In
any event, given the point where UCITA currently rests, it seems clear
that an absolute liability rule would be politically impracticable, even if
it were conceptually preferable.
The third alternative, merging the obligation and loss concepts, is
also unsatisfactory because it tends to confuse analysis. The size of the
loss influences the performance and causation issues, and skews the
parties' perceptions of a "case value" in the event of litigation. The li-
censor views a small loss as not resulting from a performance problem,
and the licensee views a large loss as increasing the likelihood that a
201. See UCC § 2-314; UCITA § 403.
202. Similarly, a pure ex post determination, akin to an "I know it when I see it" stan-
dard a la Potter Stewart (Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)) is probably too
uncertain to permit optimal product design and pricing.
203. Croley & Hanson, supra note 22, at 786.
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fact finder will covertly find a performance flaw where there was
none. 4
As a result, the model statute adopts a fourth approach. Obligation
is distinguished from remedy; what constitutes a failure to meet the ob-
ligation is also defined, or at least described, in some detail. Moreover,
the determination of a failure combines both ex ante and ex post per-
spectives. I base this approach on my experience in dealing with
contracting issues in UCITA transactions. The commercial reality is that
even the licensor's business people-as opposed to their law-
yer/scriveners-pay little heed to "theoretical" performance ex ante.?"
They know what they intend to sell/license and know much about the
actual performance characteristics of their products. These vendors,
however, are also honest and sophisticated enough to know that UCITA
transactions are as much art as science, and that performance issues are
best considered in light of the facts of a particular situation.
Thus, it is not uncommon to hear licensors respond to questions re-
garding performance obligation (and remedy, for that matter) to the
effect that "while we can't guarantee requested performance or minimal
risk, we are confident that it won't be a problem. If it is, we'll work with
you to eliminate the difficulty. '206 After all, ex ante the parties' coop-
204. In an uncontrolled and intuitive test of this phenomenon, I have quizzed various
continuing education audiences regarding the following facts taken from American Guaran-
tee & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ingrai Micro, Inc., No. 99-185 TUC ACM, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7299, *3-5 (S.D. Ariz. Apr. 18, 2000). A power outage caused a network to crash. Even after
power was restored, it took hours to restore the network to full operating condition. Ingram
employees finally returned the network to operation by bypassing a malfunctioning matrix
switch. In the days following the power outage, Ingram determined that when the power
outage occurred, the custom matrix configurations that existed prior to the outage were dif-
ferent than the default settings after the outage because the programming information had
disappeared from the random access memory. The matrix switch therefore had to be repro-
grammed with the necessary custom configurations before network communications could
be restored.
I asked different audiences (average size 50)-whether the matrix software was defective,
adding in one case that the reprogramming took 8 hours and the revenue loss was $30 mil-
lion and in the other that it took 20 minutes and the loss was only $30,000. Knowing only the
facts above, the vast majority of respondents conclude that there was a defect in the former
case but not in the latter.
205. The following discussion tends to assume that the licensor is the form-giver. This
is the most common, but by no means only, situation currently. Towle correctly points out
that technology will permit users to employ standard forms at very little cost. See Towle, No
Good Deed, supra note 37. One could argue that there is a difference between licensor and
licensee forms in that the licensee form-giver will still not have an informational advantage
regarding the product itself. However, the transactional cost asymmetry involved in pricing
the form terms would probably still preclude contractual assent by the licensor. For this rea-
son the model statute sets mandatory terms that apply regardless of the role of the form-
giver.
206. Of course, counsel to the licensor would be apoplectic if she heard this conversa-
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erative relationship with respect to performance dominates the potential
adversarial positions that might develop if performance problems ensue
and cannot be satisfactorily resolved.
This dynamic occurs equally in the form, non-negotiated transaction
where the parties dicker, if at all, on price, scope of license and other
non-contingent terms. There is little reason to believe that business peo-
ple would address the performance issues any differently in form cases
if they were in fact raised."7 Therefore, legislation that views the nature
and scope of the ex ante performance "obligation" through the lens of
the actual, ex post dispute will provide a more informed approach. In
fact, such an approach may be indistinguishable from "majoritarian"
default rule methodology, which seeks to determine what most of the
parties in the market would have agreed on if the point had been fully
negotiated."' 3 Therefore the model statute attempts to balance the flexi-
ble nature of commercial practices with a sufficiently clear set of rules
to permit reasonable guidance and planning.
UNIQUE REMEDIES FOR PERFORMANCE PROBLEMS. It does not neces-
sarily follow that remedial issues must or should be separately analyzed
from the same before and after perspectives. The reasonable drafter
could conclude that the appropriate remedies for breach in a form-based
207. In this regard, it might be questioned what factors turn the more routine form
transaction into a fully negotiated transaction. One situation, cited by Towle, is the case of
the "large licensee" who can command express and even unique warranty obligations. See
Towle, No Good Deed, supra note 37. Towle does not address, since it is not central to her
point, why this would be the case. One explanation could go as follows: The licensee's bar-
gaining power may result from either a volume purchase or from its marquee value as a
customer. In either case, it would seem that the licensor's willingness to negotiate rather than
insist on the form terms may result just as much from lower per unit distribution costs
(which would subsidize the higher warranty costs) as it does from any "superior bargaining
power" of the licensee. This explanation is consistent with the view that the use of forms
originates with the efficiency gains to, and institutional imperatives of, the licensor. See
Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1222-24. On the other hand, it might be that the licensee is able to
negotiate better warranty terms because it has already acquired sufficient expertise (either
from previous transactions with similar products or through retention of new internal or
external advisers) such that its transaction costs of pricing and negotiating the contingent
terms are not typical of other licensees. The facts in the latter circumstance might justify a
different performance obligation or remedy from the former transaction, which is more
similar in terms of efficiency effects to the pure form transaction.
208. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1989); Craswell, supra note 16, at 11. By fully
negotiated, I mean a transaction in which parties with equal knowledge and sophistication
bargain in a pie-maximizing (cooperative) rather than a pie-dividing (competitive) manner.
See, e.g., Roger Fisher and William Ury, GETTING TO YEs: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981). This does not mean that a form-giver must demonstrate a par-
ticular bargaining mode in order to prove that the transaction should not be regulated as a
form transaction. Outrageously competitive or embarrassingly weak cooperative bargaining
can still be sufficient to provide the basis for determinative reliance by the form-giver on the
form-taker's apparent knowing assent.
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UCITA transaction should not vary with the nature of the obligation
(e.g., delivery date v. product performance): no matter what, the meas-
ure of recovery should be the innocent party's benefit of the bargain,
less reasonable mitigation, plus any reasonably foreseeable consequen-
tial damages. This contractarian view, however, ignores the
commercial reality that parties opt out of traditional judicial formulae
in negotiated transactions. The fully negotiated commercial approach
assigns potential losses to the party that can most cheaply bear or shift
the loss, thereby maximizing the total return from the transaction. This
is, of course, the same result the law-and-economists believe will pro-
duce the most efficient result.209 Any statutory solution should
incorporate those truths by adopting rules that take into account the ex-
ceptionally difficult issues of causation and valuation that arise when
products do not perform to expectations.
4. Risk Management v. Loss Allocation
The last point made in the discussion of remedies-that commercial
practice and economic theory assign the burdens of performance failure
to the party who can bear the loss most cheaply-applies generally to
performance risk. It therefore deserves further attention. Any substan-
tive rule of performance obligation and remedy must allocate
performance risk on the basis, not of ability to bear loss (whether meas-
ured in terms of supposed resources or wealth or in terms of "bargaining
power"), but on ability to manage risk. 210 The differences between the
two concepts are numerous. For example, the former tends to favor re-
sult-driven conclusions, while the latter considers what the parties could
have done before, during and after the transaction. The former also
tends to favor covert judicial decision-making and therefore reduces the
likelihood of efficient dispute resolution. Most important, the latter best
reflects commercial practices by encouraging each party to forego
speculative and opportunistic behavior and to take reasonable measures
to reduce both the frequency and the severity of loss.
To be sure, UCITA's performance terms include gap-fillers that re-
211flect this distinction. Many of those rules, however, are derived from
common law and tend to distort risk management incentives, and those
that can be avoided by the licensor under § 113 and § 208.212 Legislation
209. See, e.g., Meyerson, supra note 13, at 617-18 (providing a similar insight into the
theory of a least cost avoider).
210. POSNER, supra note 68, § 6.6.
211. The warranty provisions in Part I can be viewed in this light as can §§ 809(a)(2)
and 102(13), the gap-filling terms governing consequential damages.
212. UCITA §§ 113,208.
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eviscerates the salutary nature of a risk management approach if it
merely codifies judicial doctrine and enforces form deviations from the
gap-filler provisions. A form-giver who denies the form-taker's right to
recover consequential damages evades any obligation to minimize the
risk of those damages (such as by providing early notice of a potential
problem in performance as a result of complaints from other customers)
even though the cost of that mitigation would be minimal. Therefore,
with respect to each element of a proposed legislative solution, the
question persists whether the statute would provide the necessary in-
centive to each party to minimize overall performance risk and loss.
5. Determining Whether the Performance Standard was Met:
Risk of Failure and Risk of Loss
As mentioned in item llI.A.3 supra, the distinctions between expost
and ex ante perspectives are also relevant in determining whether a
product failed to meet a performance standard." 3 Law-and-economists
have demonstrated that the failure to appreciate the differences can lead
to inefficient outcomes." The problem has significant practical impli-
cations. In litigated contract disputes, it is virtually impossible for judge
or jury to divorce the analysis of "what could have been" from what
actually happened. Empirical research has shown that people overesti-
mate the probability that an event could occur when they are aware of
an outcome in which the event did occur. '15 Thus, a statutory solution
that ignores the ex post situation invites covert decision-making. For
both these conceptual and practical reasons, a drafter must consider how
perspective affects evaluations of risk of performance failure, probabil-
ity of loss and reliability of result.
The challenge to a legislative drafter is in developing an approach
that recognizes the ex post perspective but controls it so that it does not
distort analysis as to whether the performance obligation was satisfied.
This challenge would seem particularly difficult since I have already
argued that the only commercially practicable test for determining the
content of the performance obligation includes a heavy ex post compo-
nent. 6
The present problem is subtly different from that discussed in item 3
above. The issue here is not whether the facts of the particular case can
inform the decision on the product's performance standard. It is how to
213. See supra text accompanying note 204.
214. POSNER, supra note 73, at 7-8.
215. See Eisenberg, Cognition, supra note 1, at 222-24 (discussing several empirical
studies).
216. See supra Part III.A.3.
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determine whether that standard was met through a proper balance be-
tween the licensee's interest in a perfectly operating product and the
licensor's interest in producing a commercially viable product at a mar-
ketable price. That balance can be achieved only by a solution that takes
into account three components:
(1) what the product was expected to do (the performance stan-
dard);
(2) the likelihood of a failure to meet that expectation (the per-
formance risk); and
(3) the range of potential injury to the customer (the risk of
loss).
Perhaps an illustration drawn from the data entry (cut and paste) as-
pect of the Minit-Paid hypothetical can make this point more
understandable and distinguish it from the previous discussion about the
definition of the performance standard. The question discussed under
item 3 was whether the particular programming issue-transfer of data
from another program-should be taken into account in determining the
performance standard to which Minit-Paid will be held. In other words,
do we phrase the issue as simply "Did the licensor have an obligation
(in contractarian terms, make a warranty) to provide a program that
would compile multi-timekeeper billings?" Or is the issue "Did the li-
censor have an obligation to provide a program that compiled billings
when the information was transferred from another program?"
217
Unless we can understand the "why" of the alleged failure, we can-
not provide a commercially reasonable or reliable performance
standard. To phrase the question in the more general terms as initially
stated is to invite the answer, "Of course," since the most prominent
feature of the program was the combined time-keeping and billing
function. To phrase the question in the more specific latter terms is to
focus the issue on the facts of this case, thereby permitting a focused
evaluation of the pros and cons of design and user expectations.
In contrast, the issue under discussion in this item is whether the
now-defined performance standard has been breached. This issue con-
siders (1) the likelihood that the failure to design the software to accept
information formatted by another program would substantially interfere
with the product's performance;218 and (2) the impact of the problem on
217. Neither the analysis here nor the model statute inquires whether the developer
knew or should have known about the possibility of cutting and pasting; negligence is not
the standard used at this stage.
218. This would take into account, for example, both the perceived prevalence of the
licensee's cutting and pasting practice among the likely customer base and whether the
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the customer's ability to obtain the benefits of the program. Each of
these must be evaluated in light of the commercial expectations of the
parties regarding the utility of the program and the effects of dysfunc-
tion on the licensee's business. The emphasis here must be on objective
standards and material harms. Because UCITA transactions often in-
volve relatively low cost products that support costly and revenue-
sensitive operations of licensees,219 we must be careful to limit redress
for performance problems to those that really matter. Otherwise, trivial
defects could subject the licensor to unduly severe damages.
This approach may seem cumbersome, but reliable results can be
achieved only if the solution identifies these discrete components of risk
management.
6. Insurance v. Collateral Source Rule
Both tort and contract law pay faint heed to the availability of insur-
ance as a means of risk management.20 When insurance, however, is a
commercially acceptable means of spreading risk, the legislative solu-
tion should take insurance into account in fashioning the remedy for
performance dysfunction.
The insurance industry has been slow to respond to the changing
risk profile of the Information Economy.2 ' Traditional liability cover-
ages apply only to claims for bodily injury and tangible property
damage.2 Traditional first party (property and business interruption)
insurance generally cover only physical injury to tangible property.2
Neither type of coverage enables a licensor or licensee to shift most
spreadsheet program used by this licensee had particular attributes that made the practice
unusually difficult to design around.
219. For example, a $5,000 license fee for a software program that controls the outlet
valves at a wastewater treatment plant.
220. The "collateral source rule," generally holds that a tortfeasor is not allowed to take
advantage of the insurance benefits received by the plaintiff. That rule may be generally
consistent with economic analysis because it provides an incentive for producers to cause
price to reflect risk. See POSNER, supra note 73, at 201. However, it is inconsistent with
commercial practice for the following reasons. First, in the absence of the perfect informa-
tion required by the economic model, it is unlikely that the producer will have the necessary
information to set price roughly equivalent to risk. Second, it masks the fact that the party
with insurance is generally the best risk bearer. Third, pursuing litigation where the loss has
been paid by insurance unreasonably increases transaction costs whether the litigation is
direct or a subrogation action by the insurer. Whether subrogation and contribution actions
by insurers should be permitted is an interesting question outside the scope of this article.
221. See, LEO L. CLARKE et al., E-RisK COVERtAGE GUIDE 13-25 (2000).
222. Id. at 27-38.
223. Id.
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UCITA product performance losses. 4 Even today, there are relatively
few broadly available coverages that permit transactors to shift per-
formance risk through insurance.2 Given the growth of the information
economy, insurers will soon be forced to come into step.
Suffice it to say for present purposes that any legislative solution
should recognize that generally available insurance is an excellent
indicator of the ability of a party to bear performance risk. The
transactor who can purchase insurance on the most favorable terms
should generally be viewed as the most efficient bearer of performance
risk.
7. Commercial Behavior v. Litigation Posturing:
Reducing Transaction Costs
Two primary benefits that form terms give form-givers is that they
deter the prosecution of claims for defective performance and substan-
tially reduce the net cost of defeating claims that are pursued. 6 Any
legislative solution of the forms/performance problem should seek to
reduce the transactional costs of resolving disputes while discouraging
commercially unreasonable behavior, especially litigation. 7
Because a legislative solution should not adopt the UCITA freedom
of contract ideology, the statute should not be limited to prescribing
gap-fillers.2" Instead, it should favor licensors who provide prompt and
competent product support, 229 and transactors who subscribe to commer-
cially reasonable dispute resolution procedures2 0 The goal is to reduce
transaction costs for both sides and avoid the current debacle where
customer frustration over unreasonable risk allocation leads to wasteful
class action suits.
224. An exception would be performance defects that cause defamation, invasion of
privacy and certain copyright infringements that would be covered under "advertising in-
jury" or "personal injury" coverages. Id. at 38-43.
225. Id. at 227-230.
226. See, e.g., the discussion of choice of forum and law clauses, supra Parts I.C.1 and
I.C.2.
227. By "commercially unreasonable," I refer to claims that can-and therefore
should-be resolved at substantially less cost through business solutions rather than legal
proceedings. The business solution can be provided by the licensor or the licensee. The idea
is to discourage the use of legal proceedings as leverage.
228. Transactors can avoid the force of the rules only by an explicit opt-out in a fully
negotiated context. See supra Part III.A.1.
229. For example, enforcement of a repair and replace remedy limitation will require
evidence of a commercially acceptable repair and replace service.
230. For example, a number of leading technology companies have announced an ini-
tiative to create a consumer complaint tribunal that will avoid the current problems of
customer unfriendly arbitration rules etc.
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B. A Model "Performance Risk" Statute
What follows is a model statute that could be incorporated into
UCITA to address the forms/performance problem. My hubris is not so
great that I think this is a match for the years and talent involved in
drafting UCITA, but we have to start somewhere. Although many of the
terms are vague and imprecise, they are all terms are to be construed in
a commercially reasonable manner such that business people, if not
lawyers, can give the statute sufficient content to get on with their lives.
THE MODEL PERFORMANCE RISK AMENDMENTS To UCITA
An Act in Five Parts
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA") is
hereby amended as follows:
SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS.
(a) The definition of "standard form" in §102(60) of UCITA
shall be revised to read:
(60) "Standard form" means a record or a group of related
records containing terms prepared by a form-giver for
repeated use in transactions and so used in a transac-
tion in which there was no negotiated change of
performance terms and in which the form-giver has no
reasonable expectation that the form-taker would incur
the costs necessary to evaluate the benefits or costs of
those performance terms.
(b) The following definitions shall be added to Section 102 of
UCITA:
"Form-giver" means a person who tenders a standard form in a
transaction subject to this Act.
"Form-taker" means a person to whom a standard form is ten-
dered in a transaction subject to this Act.
"Form transaction" means a transaction to which this Act ap-
plies (other than a mass-market transaction or a transaction as to
which a consumer is a party) in which performance terms
would, but for Sections 619 and 817, have included, pursuant to
Section 208, the terms in a standard form. "Form transaction"
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shall not include any transaction in which (a) the form-giver has
provided to the form-taker an opportunity to enter into a trans-
action for the same product, at a different price, on terms that do
not modify or disclaim performance terms that would apply but
for § 113 of this Act, or (b) the form-giver has provided to the
form-taker information sufficient to permit a reasonable form-
taker to evaluate the material benefits and costs of the perform-
ance terms included in the standard form.
"Performance obligations" are the obligations created by Sec-
tion 619.
"Performance remedies" are the remedies provided in Section
817.
"Performance terms" means any contract term that purports to
establish, modify or disclaim (a) any obligation of a licensor
with respect to any characteristic or standard of functionality or
performance of the product licensed in the transaction, includ-
ing without limitation warranties, or disclaimers of warranties
or (b) any remedy for breach of any such obligation.
"Product" includes computer information, informational rights
in computer information, services, and goods.
OFFICIAL COMMENT.z1
1. The definition of "standard form" differs from the current
definition in UCITA in two primary ways. The first is that
UCITA permits negotiation only on specified terms; if the
parties go beyond those aspects, for example to negotiate a
longer notice period before acceptance or waiver of rights,
then the entire contract falls out of the definition. The pro-
posed definition focuses on the non-negotiated nature of
specific terms or issues. Second, and more importantly, the
UCITA definition does not include that element that the
form-giver must not have a reasonable expectation that the
form-taker can and will evaluate the term accurately. This
element is necessary to properly limit special treatment of
231. UCITA §§ 402, 619(b). The "Official Comments" do not restate arguments pre-
sented earlier in the article except where necessary to explain statutory language.
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form terms to those transactions where the information
costs and obstacles are sufficient to create a high probability
that there will not be an efficient bargain.
2. "Form-giver" can refer to either a licensor or licensee. In
general, forms used by licensors will seek to minimize
product performance obligations, and forms used by
licensees will seek to expand those beyond the requirements
of background law. The information asymmetries that affect
form transactions generally favor licensors and other
owners of technology and computer information. However,
this Act establishes mandatory obligations and remedies
which cannot be changed by either party as long as the
transaction is a form transaction. See Section 711 (d).
3. "Form transaction" includes only transactions between
commercial parties. The exclusion for mass-market trans-
actions recognizes that the greater or at least special
protections granted to commercial licensees in those trans-
actions stem from practical and political concerns. The
designation of a transaction as a form transaction does not
involve an evaluation of relative bargaining power or so-
phistication. Even multinational licensees dealing with sole
proprietor licensors can enter into form transactions if the
requirements of the definition are satisfied.
4. In general, form-givers cannot obtain a waiver of statutory
benefits. However, a putative form-giver can always dem-
onstrate that the transaction did not involve a "standard
form" as defined in Section 102(60). See Section 711.
Moreover, two safe harbors are provided for transactions
where the reasons for the statute do not exist. "Form trans-
action" is defined to exclude those terms. As to the price
option, courts should not consider the fairness of the spread
between the two options. The provision should be construed
liberally since channeling risk into price is recognized as a
most efficient means of information about risk. As to the
disclosure option, the adequacy of disclosure is a question
for the court and is to be evaluated in light of the complex-
ity of the product, the nature of the typical user and value of
the transaction compared to the costs of assimilating the in-
formation disclosed.
5. "Product" is intended to cover all forms of consideration
transferred by the licensor. Although the typical "product" in
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a UCITA transaction is software or other "information" as
defined in § 102(35), the fact that UCITA covers some mixed
transactions which include goods and services requires a
broad term to give the performance obligation appropriate
scope.
SECTION 2. PERFORMANCE OBLIGATIONS.
The following is added to UCITA as Section 619:
SECTION 619. PERFORMANCE OBLIGATIONS IN FORM
TRANSACTIONS.
(a) Sections 105 through 113, Parts 2, 3, 4 (except Section
402) of this Act do not apply to performance obliga-
tions in form transactions. The provisions of Parts 6, 7
and 8 of this Act apply to performance obligations or
performance remedies except to the extent inconsistent
with the provisions of this Section or Sections 711 or
817 .
(b) No term or condition of any standard form shall be en-
forceable except to the extent that the standard form
provides additional rights or remedies in favor of a
person who is not the form-giver, over those otherwise
provided in this Act. Nothing in this section shall af-
fect any express warranties made as part of a form
transaction.
(c) The licensor in a form transaction has an obligation to
the initial end-user of any product that is the subject of
the transaction to cause the product to perform in ac-
cordance with the following standards:
(1) The product:
(i) Complies, subject to Sections 406 and 407, with
the warranties set forth in Sections 401, 403, 404
and 405 to the extent the transaction would fall
232. Numerous sections of UCITA would need to be amended to refer to the proposed
revision. As a manifestation of bounded rationality, I have not attempted to catalog or ana-
lyze the implications of those amendments.
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within the terms of those sections but for subsec-
tion (a) of this Section;
(ii) Is fit for the ordinary purposes for which prod-
ucts of like kind and quality are used;
(iii) Performs the functions which products of like
kind and quality perform;
(iv) Substantially conforms in all material respects to
all marketing materials used by the licensor in
distribution of the product; and
(v) Substantially complies with all material state-
ments made in documentation provided as part of
transaction.
(2) All material installation, access or use instructions are sub-
stantially accurate and reasonably adequate to permit the end-
user to obtain the ordinary benefits of the transaction in a
timely manner.
OFFICIAL COMMENT.
1. UCITA is a "contract statute," and form transactions are not
contracts in the sense of informed meetings of the minds.
Therefore, those provisions of UCITA that set forth rules of
formation and construction of contracts are generally
deemed inapplicable to the performance obligations and
performance remedies of form transactions as defined in
this statute.
2. For the same reason, the purported "contract" between the
parties is deemed ineffective. Instead the statute adopts a
mandatory set of performance standards and remedial pro-
visions.
3. The Section's use of the term "obligation" is intended to be
neutral between contract and tort principles because neither
set of doctrinal rules provides a satisfactory commercial
solution to the problem. The obligation runs only from the
licensor because it is the licensor, and not intermediary
participants in the distribution channel, who is in the best
position to control performance risk. The obligation runs
only to the initial end-user because it is between the initial
end-user and the licensor that the transactional cost and
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information asymmetries are most significant. This section
does not affect the rights and obligations of other
distributors and users.
4. The performance obligation established by subsection 2 is
defined in part by the "majoritarian" gap-filling provisions
of Part 4 of UCITA and partly by the recognition that the
majoritarian philosophy, founded as it is on assumptions of
informational and transactional cost symmetry, do not apply
to form transactions. This amendment departs, therefore,
from UCITA's general reluctance to impose on a transactor
an obligation to provide a commercially reasonable, or even
a minimal, level of performance. The implied warranties
therefore represent only one aspect of the obligation im-
posed in form transactions.
5. Regardless of the type of transaction involved, subsections
(c)(1)(ii) and (iii) impose an obligation to conform to the
purposes and functions of products of like kind and quality.
As usual, price will be a primary indicator of "like kind and
quality." Channels of distribution and marketing will also
be relevant in determining the relevant set of comparable
products. UCITA transactions frequently involve products
protected by intellectual property laws and unique products
using new technology, so it may be difficult for users to
identify close substitutes. This should not be deemed to
mean that there is no product of "like kind and quality." The
test is "like," not identical. As long as a product can be
identified that performs similar enough functions to permit
the court to identify a commercially reasonable expectation
of performance, the standards of clauses (i) and (ii) of sub-
section should be applied.
6. Marketing materials, product manuals and other documen-
tation are key sources for a determination of the transactor's
own views as to product performance. Specifications and
standards included in such materials should generally be in-
cluded in establishing the standard of performance under
this section. On the other hand, disclaimers in documenta-
tion should generally not be given effect because the same
disclaimers included in a standard form would be unen-
forceable under subsection (b).
7. Subsection (c)(2) requires that documentation be substan-
tially accurate and reasonably adequate to permit the end-
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user to enjoy the benefits of the transaction. Installation and
integration with other systems and products can cause sig-
nificant transaction costs. More complete documentation
will generally reduce such costs, and the obligation imposed
is consistent with the fact that the licensor can bear those
educational costs more cheaply than individual users with
respect to ordinary uses. The standards are not perfect accu-
racy and exhaustive detail-the test should be whether the
reasonably sophisticated typical user can use the instruc-
tions readily to gain the benefits of the transaction. On the
other hand, users are in a better position to determine the
requirements of unusual or specialized uses, and the sub-
section leaves the burden of those costs on the end-user.
The following is added to UCITA as Section 711:
SECTION 711. BREACH OF PERFORMANCE OBLIGATION
IN FORM TRANSACTIONS.
(a) A licensor in a form transaction shall be liable, to the
extent and in the manner provided in Section 817, to
the initial end-user of the product for all damages in-
curred by the end-user as a result of the licensor's
failure to perform an obligation under Section 619.
The end-user shall have the burden of proving a failure
to perform.
(b) Whether a product failed to satisfy the performance
standards set forth in Section 619 shall be determined
by taking into account all material facts and circum-
stances involved in design, production, marketing and
distribution of the product as well as in the particular
end-user's use of the product, the specific causes of
the alleged failure and the useful life of the product.
Unless the context otherwise requires, the following
factors shall be taken into account in determining
whether an attribute of a product failed to satisfy a
performance standard:
(1) The extent to which the attribute at issue is integral to the
product;
(2) The frequency and severity of losses that users could rea-
sonably be expected to incur as a result of the attribute's
failure;
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(3) The effect on utility and cost of the product if the product
had been designed not to include the attribute or to avoid
the failure; and
(4) The extent to which an end-user could avoid or mitigate the
alleged failure or loss through commercially reasonable
maintenance, up-grades or changes in practices or proce-
dures to accommodate the attribute.
(c) A licensor in a form transaction shall not be liable un-
der subsection (a) with respect to the failure of any
product to meet a performance standard set forth in
Section 619 if:
(1) The licensor proves that the failure was caused by misuse of
the product or by the failure of the initial end-user to use
reasonable commercial practices in the installation or op-
eration of the product;
(2) The licensor proves that the end-user could have avoided
the failure or resulting loss through commercially reason-
able maintenance, service or other precautionary measures;
or
(3) With respect to a failure of the product to perform in accor-
dance with Section 619(c)(1)(iii):
(i) The licensor proves that the failure did not occur
during statistically significant "beta testing" of
the product in accordance with reasonable com-
mercial practices in the licensor's trade or
industry; or
(ii) The licensor proves, by means of product per-
formance records which it maintains in the
ordinary course of its business and which reflect
the date, source, and nature of customer com-
plaints regarding the product at issue, that the
failure has occurred, as of the date of trial, with
respect to the product in less than .01% of the
transactions involving the product entered into
by the licensor.
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(d) The provisions of Sections 619, 711 and 817 cannot be
waived by either a licensor or an end-user in a form
transaction.
OFFICIAL COMMENT.
I. This Section adopts a risk management approach to deter-
mining responsibility for performance failures. Subsection 1
sets forth the general rule that the licensor is liable for all
damages incurred. However, the liability extends only to the
initial end-user for the reasons stated in connection with
Section 619.
2. Subsection (b) sets forth the elements to be considered in
evaluating whether a product failed the performance stan-
dards of Section 619. The statute places the risk of product
performance on the party that can most cheaply identify,
evaluate and mitigate that risk. Therefore, both the licensor
and the end-user are required to do what is commercially
reasonable to avoid loss. However, the primary onus for risk
management is on the licensor because the licensor has the
most knowledge about the product and is in the best posi-
tion to spread losses among all users by incorporating the
risk into the product's price.
3. Recognizing that the performance obligation under 619, the
standard of breach under this section, and the remedy for
breach are all more advantageous to users than under
existing law, subsection (c) provides several controlling
principles to limit the risk that liability will be imposed for
defects that have their source in the end-user's practices or
in defects that the licensor could not anticipate or avoid
through risk management. Clause (3) is intended to
recognize the commercial best practices of beta testing and
customer complaint tracking. The defense is limited to
questions of functionality because other failures (such as
accuracy of information in a database) are not as likely to
be discoverable through use or testing. The results of beta
testing must have been statistically significant or it cannot
be inferred that the failure is not inherent in the product.
The percentage of consumer complaints that is used in
subsection (c)(3)(ii) as a surrogate for an abnormal result
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reflects a practical resolution rather than a theoretical
approach since the premise of informational asymmetries
could justify imposing liability for a problem of
infinitesimal probability. The limitation to the status of
complaints as of time of trial obviously limits the
availability of the defense, but is deemed necessary to
preclude application to the user who is one of the first to
identify the problem.
SECTION 4. REMEDIES
The following is added to UCITA as Section 817:
SECTION 817. REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF PERFORMANCE
OBLIGATION IN FORM TRANSACTIONS.
(a) A licensor who is liable to an initial end-user under
Section 711 shall compensate the end-user with dam-
ages in the following amounts:
(1) "Benefit of the bargain" damages as follows:
(i) If the end-user rejected or revoked acceptance of
the product and procured a substitute product, the
difference between the cost to the end-user of
that substitute product and the product's price,
adjusted for differences in the products and the
terms of the licenses; or
(ii) If the end-user has retained the right to use the
product, the lesser of:
(A) the difference between the price paid by the user for
the product and the reasonable value of the product; or
(B) the cost incurred by the end-user to cause the product
to comply with the standards of Section 619; or
(C) the cost to the licensor of repairing or replacing the
product, but only if the licensor offered that service to
its customers and only if the service would have been
reasonably provided to the end-user at no cost and
without commercially unreasonable conditions; and
(2) The actual marginal expenses of the end-user incurred be-
cause employees, equipment or other resources were idled
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as a result of the licensor's failure to perform its obligation
under Section 619; and
(3) The actual marginal costs of the end-user in (i) re-entering
into a computer information lost or damaged as a result of
the failure and (ii) re-creating products lost or damaged as a
result of the failure; provided that costs of re-creating in-
formation obtained from third parties shall not be included
under this paragraph; and
(4) Any other incidental and consequential damages, including
costs of restoration and lost productivity and profits not re-
coverable under subparagraphs (2) and (3), provided that
damages awarded pursuant to this subparagraph shall not
exceed ten times the price paid by the end-user for the
product.
(b) There shall be offset against the amount due under
subsection (a) the proceeds of any amount received by
the end-user from any insurer or any other third party
with respect to the performance failure.
(c) An action to recover any amount due under this sec-
tion may be brought in the jurisdiction where the
transaction was completed, where the end-user resides
or has its principal place of business or where the
form-giver has its principal place of business. The fo-
rum will apply the law of the state of the end-user. No
terms of any standard form used in the transaction will
be admissible for any purpose except to establish the
definition of the product, the term of any express war-
ranty, the price and effective period of the license and
any other term actually negotiated by the parties.
(d) In any action described in subsection (c), the court
shall abstain from a decision if an alternative dispute
resolution process approved by
[appropriate state agency or judicial body] pursuant to
this section is available to the parties.
(e) In any action described in subsection (c), the court
shall not permit discovery until the parties, represented
by senior executives with authority to resolve the dis-
pute, have submitted the dispute to an independent
third party mediator; provided that the court may order
limited discovery if necessary to enable the end-user
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to adequately counter the form-giver's mediation po-
sitions.
(f) The provisions of Part 8 (other than Section 807(c)
through (e), Section 810 and Section 811) do not apply
to claims under this Section.
OFFICIAL COMMENT.
1. This section replaces the more general damages provisions
of Section 807 and 809 of the Act with respect to a licen-
see's damages for performance failures. The rules are
neutral with respect to the contractual gap-filling provisions
of Parts 6 and 7, which will generally apply because Section
619(2) precludes form terms from varying the provisions of
the Act.
2. The rationale for the comprehensive remedies provided in
this section is threefold. First, the true societal cost of a
product includes both the costs of its production and the
costs of the losses that the product causes when used as di-
rected. Second, it is neither efficient nor fair that isolated
users absorb randomly occurring losses attributable to the
product. Third, those who release a product into the chan-
nels of commerce are in the best position to reduce product
risk to an efficient level and to spread the remaining risk
through product pricing.
3. Nevertheless, the remedies are limited to amounts that the
end-user could not avoid through resort to commercially
reasonable alternatives. Users should use technical support
services and repair and replacement facilities provided by
licensors as long as the transactional costs of doing so are
not outweighed by continuing loss as a result of failure to
cover. Licensors have a reasonable expectation that users
will resort to those alternatives but only when the services
are provided seasonably and competently in light of the
user's circumstances.
4. The products in UCITA transactions are frequently rela-
tively inexpensive compared to the value of the transactions
in which they are key elements. Thus the license fee for a
specialized medical database with millions of items of in-
formation may be less than $50 per access, yet a
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performance failure might cause a mistreatment that could
result in a potential loss of millions of dollars. There has
therefore been great concern that imposing consequential
damages in UCITA transactions will ruin small competitors,
stifle innovation and raise barriers to entry. While those
concerns are valid to a limited extent, an absolute bar on
risk spreading through liability for consequential damages
results in an over-investment in products whose prices do
not reflect their true marginal costs and results in an undue
disadvantage for higher quality products competing with
lower quality products. The approach taken in subsection
(a) requires producers to bear those consequential damages
that are more attributable to the product failure than to the
nature of the user's business.
5. Subsections (a)(2)-(4) modify the traditional Hadley v.
Baxendale rule and impose liability for a relatively narrow
category of consequential damages. This resolution is a
compromise since it is clear, for the reasons described in
comment 4, that several types of consequential damages
from product failure are reasonably foreseeable. Direct
costs, such as downtime and costs of re-entry of lost data,
can be recovered without limitation in amount but are lim-
ited to actual marginal costs. More remote losses are limited
by subsection (a)(4) to ten times product price. The latter
limitation is not likely to be unduly burdensome to licen-
sors. The total amount is too small to affect claims
regarding low priced, high volume products, and custom
products are often not distributed through form transactions.
The subsection therefore represents an attempt to reflect the
true costs of product performance. The impact of the sub-
section on licensors is further ameliorated by the fact that
any insurance benefits payable to the user are deducted un-
der subsection (b) from the damages recoverable against the
licensor. Users will still have an incentive to mitigate con-
sequential damages risk and to obtain business interruption
insurance as the insurance markets begin to make insurance
available for intangible losses.
6. Subsections (c)-(e) are intended to reduce (1) user transaction
costs by establishing a mandatory rule that users can pursue
performance claims in their local courts and under their local
laws and (2) dispute resolution costs through alternative
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dispute resolution and discouragement of strike-type suits
where costs of discovery distort case value. Leading licensors
and licensees have commenced initiatives to provide fair and
low cost venues to resolve performance disputes. Subsection
(d) is intended to encourage such efforts by providing for
governmental evaluation and endorsement.
SECTION 5. EFFECTIVE DATE:
This Act shall become effective (at least 1 year
off).
OFFICIAL COMMENT.
1. This Act substantially changes existing law. To the extent
that licensors have relied on the enforceability of standard
forms, their reliance may have been incorporated into pric-
ing and product design decisions. The delayed effective date
provided in this section will allow time for parties and mar-
kets to adjust to the new rules.
C. Comparing the Resolution of Hypothetical Disputes
Under UCITA and the Model Statute
How will cases be resolved under the model statute compared to the
resolution under UCITA? Perhaps the best way to examine a statute is
to apply it to a fairly typical situation. In this section, I will apply the
two statutes to the hypotheticals introduced at the beginning of this arti-
cle.
1. The Software Hypothetical
UCITA. To begin with the time-keeping software hypothetical in-
volving Minit-Paid and HOE Engineers, HOE's claim is that
performance defects caused its network to crash on installation and that
the program would not compile invoices for multiple timekeeper files.
The answer under UCITA is straightforward. The clickwrap is enforced
according to its terms since I posited that there is no basis for a finding
of unconscionability or conflict with fundamental public policy. There-
fore, HOE has no remedy. It does not need a new CD, it has no right to
incidental or consequential damages and it has no claim that would sug-
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gest that exercising its right to arbitrate would be worthwhile. It cannot
even attempt to exert pressure on Minit-Paid by complaining on Internet
bulletin boards or in chatrooms because those complaints could amount
to a "negative" review of the product and open HOE to breach of con-
tract claims.
THE MODEL STATUTE. The shrinkwrap/clickwrap qualifies as a
"standard form" and the grant of the license as a "form transaction."
Therefore, Minit-Paid has a performance obligation under § 619, and
the shrinkwrap and clickwrap are unenforceable under § 619(b). So far,
the analysis seems unproblematic.
The next step is to determine Minit-Paid's performance obliga-
tion.'3' There are two alleged defects-the installation problem and the
invoice compilation problem. As to the former, HOE would argue that
§ 619(c)(1)(iii) establishes a standard that any software program must
install without causing a system crash. HOE will also claim that the in-
stallation standard of § 619(c)(2) requires the documentation be
sufficient to permit installation without a crash.
As to the compilation defect, HOE would argue that § 619(c)(1)(ii)
sets a standard that the ordinary purpose of multi-user time-keeping and
billing software is to compile a unified bill. 4 Second, HOE would argue
that the program did not perform the functions similar to other programs
of like kind and quality under clause (iii). Third, it might argue that the
marketing materials stated that the program would compile the billing
statements "automatically", thereby failing the substantial conformance
standard of clause (iv). Finally, it might seek to prove that the user's
manual disclosed nothing about restrictions on entry of time data,
thereby creating a failure of full and accurate documentation under
§ 619(c)(2).
Once the relevant standards are identified, HOE has the burden un-
der § 711 to prove that Minit-Paid failed to perform its obligation to
cause the program to meet those standards. The highest hurdles for HOE
on the installation claim will be causation under § 711 (a) and whether
the software documentation should have included information to enable
the installer to avoid the cause of the crash, such as deletion of other
software on HOE's servers or other computers. Tucked within that issue
will undoubtedly be product design issues (i.e. should Minit-Paid have
233. I assume, for purposes of simplicity, that there are no express warranty claims. If
there were, HOE could pursue those under UCITA §§ 402 and 619(b).
234. A different situation would be presented if the software only performed the billing
function and did not include a separate time-keeping function. In that event, the underlying
assumption-what works for one part of the program (time keeping) should also work for
the related part-would not follow. So, the software might be fit for the ordinary purpose of
creating bills (only) because the quality of data input is external to the program.
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designed around such potential conflicts?) that will require recourse to
the risk management factors of § 711 (b). 5
With respect to the compilation defect, the primary issue will be the
application of the risk management factors of § 711(b). Certainly the
transfer function between time keeping and invoice creation were integral
to the product under subsection (b)(1). Whether the frequency/severity
element is satisfied will turn on how reasonable it would be to expect
cutting and pasting from other programs. It would seem HOE has an
uphill fight on that issue, but discovery might produce examples of
similar customer complaints. If HOE demonstrates that the risk of losses
was sufficient to require a design change, it will have to prove that the
change would not have substantially interfered with the utility and cost
of the product. Given the prevalence of the cutting and pasting exercise,
it would not seem-to this non-engineer-to have been difficult for
Minit-Paid to have programmed around the problem. Finally, clause (4),
which looks to the licensee's ability to avoid the risk, would not apply
here unless there was some basis to argue that HOE should have tested
the program early in its first billing cycle. In sum, HOE would have rea-
sonable arguments that the program failed to meet the performance
standards.
The next step is to determine whether the licensor has any defenses
under § 711(c). The two relevant clauses, absent the necessary facts to
support findings under clause (3), are clauses (1) and (2), which pre-
clude recovery if the licensee does not follow reasonable commercial
practices. Clause (1) applies to the installation claim because it requires
that the installer take commercially reasonable precautions in installing
the program. Clauses (1) and (2) apply to the compilation claim. How-
ever, HOE's cutting and pasting technique, while perhaps inefficient,
does not seem commercially unreasonable. On the other hand, clause
235. Resolution of these issues will probably turn on the testimony of expert witnesses,
as is the case with most product liability claims. This will mean that most performance
claims cannot be disposed of on summary judgment, a fact that White criticizes as inefficient
and unfair. White, supra note 29, at 350. I find White's criticism (of the reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine) in this regard to be unpersuasive since it seems to flow in part from an
unflattering opinion of consumer counsel. Id. at 341 n. 151. That concern would be better
addressed specifically rather than generally. Moreover, the present issue is distinguishable
from White's reasonable expectations argument since the technical aspects of UCITA trans-
actions, as opposed to the meaning of express terms of a contract, are unlikely to be within
the common experience of judges. In any event, White's objection could be met by making
the determination of the § 619(c) performance standard a question of law for the court and
therefore determinable on summary judgment. The rationale could be that the question in-
volves the same gate-keeping function as determination of standard of care in a negligence
action or integration under the parol evidence rule.
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(2) would appear to preclude HOE from recovering for any losses after
the problem was first discovered since the glitch is easily solved.
It therefore appears that HOE would qualify to recover its costs un-
der § 817. HOE's expenses for getting the system up after the
installation crash would be covered under § 817(a)(3) and its losses
arising from its inability to use the system would be covered by
§ 817(a)(2).
The analysis of damages for the compilation defect is straightfor-
ward. The nature of the glitch should not require Minit-Paid to pay
"benefit of the bargain" damages under § 817(a)(1)(ii) because the
commercially reasonable fix is simply to change the method of input
and there is no reason to believe that the new method will be more sig-
nificantly more expensive than cutting and pasting.z6 Section 817,
however, would allow HOE to recoup its costs of re-entering the data
for the past bills (§ 817(a)(3)), and to recover the cost of manually com-
piling the billing statements and lost interest on delayed billings up to
ten times the limit on consequential damages (§ 817(a)(4)). This result
is consistent with the statute's premise that transactional costs from
even relatively minor performance failures should be borne by the licen-
sor as the most efficient risk avoider/spreader.
Of course, the burden of that liability on licensors will be mitigated
by the fact that transaction costs of pursuing the claim will generally
obviate nuisance claims for small amounts.27 Even though the statute
generally reduces claim resolution costs in comparison to current prac-
tice, resolution costs will still be significant in relation to damages
except in severe cases, so it is still unlikely that parties will pursue un-
economic litigation. 2  Therefore, the most significant effect of the
statute may not be a change in the results or amount of litigation. In-
stead, the most important impact might be the fact that the statute
changes the status quo or background acceptable result.79 Recognizing
an enforceable right for performance defects regardless of form terms
will in itself shift the relative ex post bargaining positions of the parties
236. By this point the reader might suggest that the statute could be reduced to the es-
sence of "Thou shalt be commercially reasonable in form transactions." Based on my Judeo-
Christian heritage, I would accept that resolution, but it appears politically unrealistic given
the mere existence of a complex statute like UCITA.
237. This objective is now accomplished to some extent through form limitations on
remedies and choice of forum clauses.
238. In fact, Korobkin suggests that "tailored default rules" like those of the statute in-
crease resolution costs compared to untailored or majoritarian rules because they require the
courts to investigate what the particular parties would have agreed to if they had focused on
the contingency that created the dispute. Korobkin, supra note 19, at 670 et seq.
239. Id.
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as they work out business accommodations to performance problems.4
That is a result the UCITA drafters should applaud.
2. The Information Access Hypothetical
UCITA. Under UCITA jargon, the Geodata-Spacechain license is an
"access contract" as defined in § 102(1), and the maps and associated
data are "information," "informational content" and "published infor-
mational content." '' Regardless, the form license agreement is
enforceable according to its terms, so all implied warranties are dis-
claimed and parol evidence of the conversations about enforcement
cannot be admitted 2 Therefore, Spacechain has no claim unless Geo-
data breached the contract specification regarding reliability.
First, assume that Spacechain is confident it could survive summary
judgment on the reliability issue. Spacechain's confidence, however,
does not matter. The contractual limitation on remedies to a six-month
extension of access at no additional cost will be enforced, 43 and its
claims for incidental damages and consequential damages fall to the
limitations in the form.'M Spacechain, like HOE, is out of luck under
UCITA.
MODEL STATUTE. Not surprisingly, the issues are different under the
model statute. The form contract is vaporized since Geodata could not
show that the exceptions apply. The mere fact that Spacechain's repre-
sentative asked about the boilerplate is not enough to take the
transaction out of the statute's grasp. The application of the statute turns
on actual negotiation and the form-giver's reasonable expectation that
the user will incur the required information and transaction costs. Nei-
ther element is satisfied here.
240. Id. at 672-73.
241. UCITA §§ 102(35), 102(37), 102(52). The maps and data will be "published in-
formational content" if they were "made available to recipients generally ... in substantially
the same form." Whether the product delivered to Spacechain is "published informational
content" will depend to a certain extent on what "made available" means. It is perhaps un-
likely that other Geodata customers will request the same congeries of maps as Spacechain,
but the fact that others could do so should mean that Geodata makes them "available...
generally" See UCITA § 102 cmt. 46.
242. UCITA §§ 301, 406. Interestingly, UC1TA creates no implied warranty of any
type with respect to published informational content. And even if the maps and data were not
published informational content, the implied warranty for informational content is limited to
"no inaccuracy ... caused by [Geodata's] failure to perform with reasonable care." The
policy underpinnings for these drastic provisions are freedom of information flow concerns,
which are hardly persuasive, but that is a topic for another day.
243. UCITA § 803(a)(1). Under § 803(b), the exclusive remedy would not be enforced
if it "failed of its essential purpose." UCITA § 803(b). The Official Comment to § 803 makes
it clear, however, that the exception is to be narrowly construed. UCITA § 803 cmt. 5.
244. UCITA § 803(d).
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Section 619(c)(2) might also establish a performance standard in
this case. Because reliability caused concern sufficient to warrant its
inclusion, a reasonably persuasive argument can be made that Geodata
should include information relevant to reliability-even though it were
held not to "warrant" reliability-so that users could make their own
determinations and use the product appropriately. Here it would not be
imposing too great a burden on Geodata to require it to provide reliabil-
ity data (such as source and date) on a webpage for this purpose. Its
failure to do so could be deemed to violate this standard because with-
out that information the use documentation is not reasonably complete.
Assuming that the performance standards of § 619 required either
that the database include the most recent Michigan data or that adequate
information be provided to allow users to determine reliability, we turn
to § 711 to determine if Geodata's product failed those standards. We
turn first to the balancing test of § 711 (b). I will focus solely on the four
"mandatory" elements of the test. Under clause (1), the question is the
extent to which the reliability (currency) of the Michigan data was inte-
gral. Given the license fee, the nature of the user and the mention of
reliability in the form, it would seem that reliability of information is
integral if the product were to perform any useful function.
Clauses (2) and (3) require evaluation of the ex ante risks of harm
from licensing the database with the outdated data. Clause (2) looks to
the risk that significant losses could occur, while clause (3) requires an
evaluation of how avoiding the problem would affect cost and utility.
On the one hand, we have the apparent testimony of Geodata's staff that
they did not think that that the data made much difference. Nothing in
the statute, however, indicates that a party's good faith beliefs matter;
the tests of the two clauses are objective. On the other hand, we have
Spacechain's claim that the difference in success ratios points to the
currency problem as a cause. Correlation alone does not establish cause
and effect.
Both of these points need to be demonstrated. Certainly the differ-
ences in the old and new records might have been insignificant, but it
does not appear that either Geodata or its licensees viewed Geodata as
an evaluator of information. If they had, then the price would have re-
flected that value, which would make it more difficult, not less, for
Geodata to argue that the product performed as it should have. Thus, we
are left with the fact that it is reasonable to forecast significant reliance
losses by users from outdated information in a database, and Geodata
loses the risk management test. The frequency of the risk (each time the
Michigan information is accessed) and the severity (costs incurred in
reliance) outweigh the cost of avoidance (either paying the increased fee
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Therefore, Spacechain can recover for the bad information if it can
establish a failure to comply with the product standard. The "product"
consists of the maps and layered data. The performance failure is that
the data is inaccurate because it has been superceded. Geodata knew
that the data was superceded, but believed that the changes would be
immaterial.
Spacechain's burden is to demonstrate under § 711 that the product
failed to meet Geodata's obligation to provide a product whose per-
formance satisfied the standard of § 619. There are several possibilities.
The first is an express warranty, available under § 619(b).245 The specifi-
cation in the form license that Geodata has deemed information in the
database reliable could be construed to constitute an express warranty
under UCITA § 402. The UCITA subsection applicable only to pub-
lished informational content is virtually inscrutable, and Official
Comment 8 on the issue is prolix.2 46 For present purposes, it suffices that
Comment 8 appears to recognize that express contractual commitments
will be enforced. Thus, Spacechain would have a reasonable argument
that Geodata' s use of information that it knew was outdated violated the
reliability term of the form. 2 4 7
If that argument is unpersuasive, Spacechain could look to the
"implied warranty" standards under § 619(c), of which (c)(1)(ii) looks
to be the most promising."5 Under that standard, Spacechain will have
to provide evidence on products of like kind and quality. Following the
Official Comment to § 619, Spacechain is not limited to geographic in-
formation products but to other products offering similar informational
components. The question under (c)(ii) then is whether such dated or
superceded information is generally usable 9 Under clauses (iv) and
(v), Spacechain would also want to review marketing materials (whether
or not relied on by Spacechain) and product documentation to see if
they mention anything about currency of database content.
245. It was not necessary to reach the express warranty issue under UCITA because the
limitation of remedy made it commercially insignificant.
246. UCITA § 402 cmt. 8. The thrust is that the "basis of the bargain" rule used in UCC
Article 2 does not apply. UCC §§ 2-313, 2A-210,
247. A reasonable construction of "reliable" in this case is that the user can rely on
what Geodata purports to be Michigan information to the same extent as if the user accessed
Michigan's databases directly. Certainly, the reasonable user could not assume that Geodata
was warranting the reliability 'of the content of hundreds of databases managed by third par-
ties.
248. Sections 619(c)(1)(i) and 619(c)(1)(iii) do not seem relevant here.
249. Geodata might argue that Spacechain's use is not "ordinary" but particular and
that the Model Statute does not imply a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The
resolution of that issue will turn on whether a significant number of users of such informa-
tion rely on it for similar purposes. Geodata's own marketing efforts and distribution
channels will be relevant in this regard.
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for the current data and incorporating the cost into price or disclaiming
currency).
That takes us to the fourth element-the extent to which users could
avoid the losses. Here Geodata is in a much better position to identify
currency issues at a lower cost. Individual users would have to other-
wise check each underlying source for currency before each use. Since
the appeal of a database like Geodata's is to avoid such costs, clause
(4) suggests that Geodata failed to meet its obligation.
In sum, it appears that the risk of loss from the performance prob-
lem Spacechain experienced could have been more efficiently avoided
(or spread among all users) by Geodata. Therefore, Geodata should be
held to be liable under § 711.
The next issue under the statute is the measure of damages
Spacechain can recover under § 817. This is another case, like the
Minit-Paid case, where the damage is done before the user discovers the
problem and where the user can avoid further consequential loss by
seeking recourse to another source for the defective data. This case dif-
fers, however, in that the user cannot fix the performance problem, even
though it may desire to keep the license in effect. Here, as in many ac-
cess contracts, the pricing will provide a ready partial answer: the
license with respect to the Michigan database is essentially worthless to
Spacechain and the license fee can in effect be so adjusted under
§ 817(a)(1)(ii)(A).
Those damages do not necessarily compensate Spacechain for all
diminution in value since the remaining individual databases are worth
less to Spacechain as they cannot be used for Michigan. In other words,
if Spacechain computed the value of the license by allocating the costs
of general databases on a per-state basis, it does not get the benefit of its
bargain. On the other hand, there is no indication that Geodata priced
access in that fashion, so it might not be unfair to hold Spacechain to
Geodata's pricing. There appears to be no logical way to resolve this
inconsistency-but recall that Geodata's marginal cost of permitting
Spacechain access to one more database is essentially zero. Since Geo-
data failed to meet its performance obligation and is not out-of-pocket
even if the access price to other databases is reduced pro rata, the stat-
ute (§ 817(a)(1)(ii)(A)) provides a remedy that reflects Spacechain's
probable pricing decision. This result better achieves the remedial pur-
pose of risk allocation by causing licensors to account for risks in their
pricing.
In addition to "benefit of the bargain" damages, Spacechain is enti-
tled to its consequential damages under § 817(a)(3) and (4). Spacechain
might seek the costs of creating new market analyses, the cost of new
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mailings and lost revenue up to the statutory limit. Inclusion of all these
elements, however, would constitute double recovery. Spacechain will
receive the benefit of its bargain, either by receiving the revenue it
would have obtained if the database had met the performance standard
(measured by the consequential damages) or by receiving damages
equal to its out of pocket costs incurred in making new mailings. It can-
not receive damages based on both the failed mailing and a substitute
mailing.
3. A Look in the Rearview Mirror: How the Model Statute
would have Applied to Y2K
American firms spent billions of dollars "remediating" the Year
2000 dating problem.250 The situation might be viewed as the largest
performance risk in history, given the dire predictions that flooded the
media for eighteen months before the dreaded date change. Despite the
amounts spent on remediation, litigation over the liabilities of software
developers has been minimal."' Most observers, other than the lawyers
who expected a litigation feeding frenzy, probably prefer to leave the
remediation expense where it lies. In any case, it is fair to ask how the
model statute would have responded to the situation.
Had the model statute been in effect, the economic loss rule would
not have deterred potential claims.z2 Therefore, the initial inclination of
counsel to software licensees may have been to assert claims for defec-
tive software. That being said, claims under the model statute would run
into two significant obstacles for older software. First, if two-digit date
coding were state of the art programming at the time of development,
the program would have met the performance standards set forth in
§ 619(c)(1). Second, licensees would have to show under § 711 that li-
censors could more cheaply manage the risk of extended life of software
whose utility spanned decades.
As the price of memory dropped and the century change ap-
proached, the decisions of programmers to continue to market software
with two-digit dating invited consideration of performance risk. Note
that this is not to say that a two-digit product would be per se defective.
The licensor developing products during the transition period could ad-
dress the issue through disclosure that the program had two digit coding
and might require revision or replacement before 2000.
250. This section assumes that the reader has a working knowledge of the Year 2000
issue. For an explanation of the problem and its roots, see Alces & Book, supra note 189.
251. See Year 2000 Litigation and Arbitration that have been filed, available at
http://www.thefederation.org/public/Y2K/lawsuits.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2001).
252. See Alces & Book, supra note 189.
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The other significant deterrent to performance claims is placement
of risk-control responsibility on licensees under § 711(b) and (c). As
Y2K gained notoriety, sophisticated licensees also became aware of it.
Many of the remediation costs incurred resulted from integration of
software into complex systems. Individual licensors are not in a position
to control those decisions, although they do have a duty to address
common integration issues as the previous hypotheticals have demon-
strated.
Thus, the model statute's answer to Y2K is similar to the answer to
the forgoing hypotheticals: the answer is not as black-and-white as ex-
isting law would have it, but it does offer the benefits of a scalpel to
UCITA's bludgeon. Licensors who maintained state of the art practices
and provided licensees with notice of the potential problem as the state
of the art began to change would be protected. Licensees would have
every incentive to stay abreast of design developments that affected
complex systems and to remediate those systems before disaster hit. On
the other hand, developers who licensed programs with two-digit dating
in the mid-1990s might have been liable for not having programmed
around the problem or disclosing it. We might have seen more litiga-
tion, but litigation is preferable to the current state where licensees have
been forced to pass on to their customers Y2K costs that perhaps should
have been spread among the shareholders and customers of the software
developers.
In sum, the model statute provides a much more detailed analysis of
the transactors' rights and remedies. The use of risk management crite-
ria subjects the process and outcome subject to many variables. The
generality of the damages provisions-like UCITA's-makes determi-
nation of a precise measure of damages less than certain. The
squishiness of the statute is, however, one of its virtues. Drafters cannot
encapsulate commercial practices and decision-making in formulas, es-
pecially given the broad spectrum of UCITA transactions and our lack
of experience with market-cum-juridical outcomes. If we value com-
mercial practicality, it must come at the expense of the certainty lawyers
desire but business people seldom expect. Llewellyn could expect no
more.
D. A Semi-Final Word on Performance Risk and Innovation
Technological innovation is to be encouraged, but not at any cost.
One only has to consider the long-term costs to the environment that
resulted from encouraging innovation in our manufacturing economy
from the 1930s to the 1970s without requiring manufacturers to inter-
nalize the external costs of their production. By not encouraging
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producers to build all product costs (including the costs of losses due to
performance defects) into pricing, we are only encouraging innovation
for the sake of innovation.
As the practice of beta testing software has proven, no one is served
by releasing products for distribution before acceptable levels of func-
tionality are established. The model statute is flexible enough to allow
each producer to determine when the lure of profit justifies incurring the
risk of liability for performance defects. Thus, the model statute can be
said to chill innovation only to the extent that responsible risk manage-
ment is viewed as less than socially optimal behavior. The model statute
adopts the philosophy of our tax-and-spend economists:' if society de-
sires faster innovation, the more efficient approach would be to tax
computer information licensees generally and subsidize innovation,
rather than allow the losses of premature products to fall randomly on
users.
UCITA does not require licensors to manage, spread or even com-
municate performance risk. The model statute is designed to provide
commercial transactors with a framework to make product choices
based on their risk tolerance. By improving the accuracy of those deci-
sions, the model should encourage, not chill, optimal innovation.
CONCLUSION
Americans have a love-hate relationship with technology. We be-
come quickly dependent on each new technological advance and grow
impatient for the next development. Computers and software now pro-
vide us with the ability to access, produce and process information in
-ways and in timeframes undreamed of just a few years ago. Nothing is
more frustrating, however, than a computer crash or the retrieval of a
megabyte of irrelevant data by a search engine.
In this context, it is not surprising that licensors seek to rush new
products to market and cope as best they can with disappointed custom-
ers. In a sense this is a realm where the law should have feared to tread.
UCITA's promulgation makes that option as obsolete as a vacuum tube
253. This is not to suggest that the external costs of performance risk in UCITA trans-
actions are as large or as important to future generations as our environmental problems.
One's inability to check email ten times per hour is unlikely to have the same impact as dis-
charges of mercury into drinking water. I use the narrow timeframe above to reflect the fact
that during that period American government and industry were aware of the environmental
hazards, but preferred to encourage innovation and economic growth. The approach of the
Conference and its supporters seems comparable.
254. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 73, at § 8.2.
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or a punch card. If a statute regulates the full breadth of "computer in-
formation transactions," it should provide a workable solution for the
form contract performance puzzle. A statute that seals itself with the
Llewellyn coat of arms as a true believer in commercial reality should
immerse itself in that reality and not flee to formalistic fictions of free-
dom of contract, assent and duty to read. Scholarship-and not just of
the law and economics variety--can shed light on how markets and
contractors really function. Clearly, they do not function well in a world
of complex information asymmetries and high transaction costs.
This article has followed the scholarship of Slawson, Rakoff, Eisen-
berg and numerous others in demonstrating that the use of standard
forms in UCITA transactions does not lead to efficient or fair transac-
tions, at least insofar as they purport to assign risks of product
performance. Enforcement of shrinkwrap and cickwrap agreements
premised on the form-taker's failure to comply with the duty to read is
nothing more than a fiction masking a subsidy to inefficient form-
givers. UCITA is a marvelous work of draftsmanship, but its provisions
and comment regarding standard forms and contingent performance
terms cannot withstand the strains placed on it by economic theory and
commercial reality. To put it bluntly yet with all due respect, the
UCITA solution leads to form-giver tyranny rather than bilateral free-
dom of contract.
Neither traditional contract nor tort principles satisfactorily deal
with these issues. Legislation must therefore recognize the necessity of
imposing risk management obligations on the transactor who is in the
best position to avoid or spread the costs of product failure. Similarly,
traditional remedies and resolution procedures must give way to rules
that provide transactors the incentive to minimize transaction costs and
aggregate losses.
Rather than simply describe what could be done with a different
legislative approach, I have burdened the reader with a model statute
designed to amend UCITA, complete with ersatz Official Comments.
Whether it is a cure worse than the disease I leave to you. But there is
little doubt that a uniform and comprehensive law that acquiesces in the
random imposition of losses with the excuse that "that's what the parties
bargained for" cannot be defended on economic or normative grounds.
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